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Labor Rights and Environmental Protection
under NAFTA and Other U.S. Free
Trade Agreements
David A. Gantz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Free trade agreements ("FTAs") such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")1 and the more than a dozen
subsequent accords negotiated by the United States primarily in
the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st Century, with Israel (the
first, in 1985), Canada, Mexico (through NAFTA), Jordan, Singa-
pore, Chile, the CAFTA-DR nations (Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua),
Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama and
South Korea,2 are not commonly thought of as human rights
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law, Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona, and Director, International Trade and Business Law Program. Copyright ©
2010, 2011, David A. Gantz. The author is grateful to Petra Emerson, Rogers College
of Law, Class of 2010, for her research and editing assistance.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S. - Mexico -
Canada, [hereinafter "NAFTA"], 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), also available at http://www.
nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conlD=590 (full text and annexes) (last visited Dec.
21, 2010).
2. United States-Israel: Free Trade Area Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24
I.L.M. 653, available at http://tcc.export.gov/TradeAgreements/AllTrade_
Agreements/exp_005439.asp; United States-Canada: Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Can., Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CFTA] (suspended when
NAFTA entered into force); Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-
Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset uploadfile250_5112.pdf; United States-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003)
[hereinafter Singapore FTA], available at,http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/FinalTexts/asset_upload-file708_4036.pdf;
U.S.-Chile (2003), United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6,
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 (2003) [hereinafter Chile FTA], available at, http://www.ustr.
gov/assetslTrade.Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/asset-upoad-file535
_3989.pdf; The United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-CAFTA-DR, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter CAFTA-
DR]; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43
I.L.M. 1248 (2004) [hereinafter AFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade
Agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/FinalText/SectionIndex.html; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco (June 15, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005)
[hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/
Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/FInalText-SectionIndex.html; United State-Bahrain Free
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agreements. However, these accords frequently contain provi-
sions that reflect principles embodied in international human
rights accords. Not only do the FTAs incorporate provisions pro-
tecting internationally recognized labor rights and undertakings
designed to lead to a cleaner environment, but they also contain
obligations relating to international human rights such as afford-
ing respect for the rule of law, transparency in government and
the like. This article reviews the labor and environmental provi-
sions of key U.S. FTAs from NAFTA to the United States - Peru
Trade Promotion Agreement ("Peru TPA"). Particular attention is
given to the evolution of those provisions and to their focus on citi-
zen submissions and dispute settlement. In the latter case, the
article discusses possible/available trade sanctions.
The inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in
regional trade agreements ("RTAs") is not common practice other
than by the United States; most such arrangements, except for the
European Union and its most recent FTAs, do not address these
issues. I have not discussed FTAs concluded by countries other
than the United States, largely because most do not contain sig-
nificant provisions related to enforcement of labor rights and envi-
ronmental provisions. It is only the recent Canadian FTAs that
contain provisions similar to those in the Bush era FTAs (such as
CAFTA-DR) with third party dispute settlement mechanism and
sanctions (including monetary penalties) limited to the labor
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sep. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005), available at http:l!
www.ustr.gov/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/BahrainFTA/final-texts/SectionIndex.
html; United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, http://
www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/OmanFTA/FinalTextSectionindex.
html; United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/FinalTexts/Section_
Index.html [hereinafter Peru TPA or PTPA]; United States-Colombia Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/ColombiaFTAIFinalTextlSectionIndex.html [hereinafter
Colombia FTAI (not in force as of Sep. 15, 2011); United States-Panama Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/PanamaFTA/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter Panama TPA]
(not in force as of Sep. 15, 2011); Free Trade Agreement between the United States
and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Korea, June 30, 2007, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_KoreaFTAfFinalText/SectionIndex.html
[hereinafter KORUS] (not in force as of Sep. 15. 2011).
3. In a 2008 non-random study of approximately fifty regional trade agreements,
only a few such agreements, i.e. the EU, Canada-Costa Rica and the EU-Cariforum
Economic Partnership Agreement, included labor and/or environmental provisions.
DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW POLICY AND PRACTICE (Carolina
Academic Press, 2009) 68-69 (Table 4-1) (hereinafter "Gantz, RTAs")
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provisions.4
Still, the European Union-Cariforum Economic Partnership
Agreement reiterates the Parties' commitment to sustainable
development. It calls for "high levels of environmental and public
health protection" and improving environmental laws and poli-
cies, as well as for "reaffirming their commitment to the respect
for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law ....
However, while monitoring is incorporated, there is no mechanism
for addressing citizen complaints, nor any enforcement mecha-
nism. In the labor rights area, there is a general commitment in
the EU-Cariforum EPA to the International Labour Organiza-
tion's ("ILO") core labor standards and a commitment not to use
labor rights issues for protectionist purposes.
In Part II, I discuss labor rights and environmental protection
as human rights and note other aspects of U.S. FTAs that may be
considered as supporting fundamental human rights, even though
they are often couched in different terms from those found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the United
Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic
and Social Rights. Whether or not one believes that all or some of
the labor and environmental provisions reflect human rights prin-
ciples, these provisions differ substantially from traditional
human rights accords. The FTA provisions are both narrower in
scope and far more extensive in terms of implementation and
enforcement.
In Part III, I review the incorporation of labor rights and envi-
ronmental protection provisions in selected U.S. FTAs from
NAFTA through the US-Jordan FTA, CAFTA-DR and the Peru
TPA. Each selected U.S. FTA represents a particular approach to
dealing with labor and the environment. There is some variation
4. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru,
May 29, 2008, chs. 16 (labor), 17 (environment) , available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
Trade/CANPER/CANPERe/CANPERindexe.asp; Agreement on Labour
Cooperation between Canada and the Republic of Peru, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/Trade/CAN PER/CAN PER_e/LabourCPFTA-e.asp (last visited Dec. 23,
2010) (Arts. 12-20, provide for consultation, panel review and monetary fines);
Agreement on Environment between Canada and the Republic of Peru, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
Canada-PeruEnvironment-en.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2010) (under art. 12 dispute
resolution is limited to consultations).
5. CARIFORUM - EC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), Oct. 2008,
Preamble, arts. 183-85, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAR-EU_EPAe/
careujine.ASP (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
6. Id., arts. 191-93.
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even among contemporary FTAs that are not specifically
addressed (including most of those listed in note 2, supra), as in
the inclusion of labor or environmental councils, but for the most
part the differences are minor.
In Part IV, I analyze the significance of changes in treatment
of labor and environmental issues. Part IV also discusses oppor-
tunities and challenges for improving the functioning of labor and
environmental provisions in existing FTAs, and incorporating
labor rights and environmental provisions in future U.S. FTAs.
Finally, in Part V I offer a few additional recommendations and
conclusions.
II. LABOR, ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER TRADE AGREEMENT
OBLIGATIONS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
As one prominent trade scholar has suggested, the broader,
albeit hidden, linkages of trade and human rights should not be
ignored, particularly not the significance of the so-called "rule of
law" issues.7 How do broader non-labor and non-environmental
provisions of FTAs reinforce and support the labor and environ-
mental objectives of those agreements? In the FTAs, in addition
to (the over-arching) government-to-government dispute settle-
ment and broader obligations to provide administrative or judicial
review of administrative decisions so as to assure administrative
due process, there are almost always also specific transparency
requirements.8 U.S. FTAs are also replete with provisions assur-
ing non-discrimination against foreign persons by requiring the
Parties and their administrative and legal institutions to extend
national treatment for traders in goods, investors or service prov-
iders, among others. NAFTA itself has multiple such obligations
relating to trade in goods, government procurement, investment
and services,9 all of which may directly benefit private individuals.
Others have argued that the basic exceptions to free trade
7. Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements and the Rule of Law in
the Americas: the Human Rights Face of Free Trade Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L.
59, 62 (2005) [hereinafter "Powell"]. See also STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE (NYU
Press, 2009) (addressing the trade-human rights linkages in detail).
8. See, e.g., NAFTA, art. 509 (providing for advance administrative rulings on
customs issues); art. 510 (providing judicial review and appeal of customs
determinations); ch. 18 (publication, notification and administration of laws,
including review and appeal of decisions); NAAEC and NAALC administrative
provisions, discussed infra.
9. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 301 (trade in goods); art. 1002 (government
procurement); art. 1102 (investment); art. 1202 (services); art. 1405 (financial
services); art. 1703 (intellectual property).
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obligations under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT"), especially those related to public morals, pro-
tection of human, animal and plant life and health and prison
labor, ° demonstrate the existence of a relationship between inter-
national trade and human rights,1' although meeting the require-
ments of Article XX's "chapeau" has proven difficult in practice. 2
(This is significant in part because the GATT Article XX excep-
tions are incorporated by reference into virtually all U.S. FTAs.")
Also, as Salmon Bal observes, Article XX exceptions apply to
"allow measures considered harmful to market access when a suf-
ficient social or economic justification exists." 4 Nevertheless, in
the Ministerial Declaration beginning the Doha Development
Round there is no mention of labor rights in the tentative agenda,
even though trade and environment is incorporated, albeit to a
very limited degree. 5
Making a compelling case for labor rights as human rights is
more straight-forward, simply because many of the key labor
rights principles are specifically mentioned in international
human rights and other closely related conventions. For example,
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR") expressly
recognizes the right to work; free choice of employment; just and
favorable conditions of work; protection against unemployment;
non-discrimination and the right to equal pay for equal work; and
the right to form and join trade unions. 6 Even though the many
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, arts. XX(a), XX(b), XX(e).
11. Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights:
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade 62, 63 (2001).
12. The Article XX exceptions can be invoked only if they are not applied in a non-
discriminatory manner and not as "a disguised restriction on international trade."
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (WT/DS135/AB/R) , circulated Mar. 12,
2001, adopted Apr. 5, 2001, paras. 155-175.
13. See, e.g., NAFTA, art. 2101(1); CAFTA-DR, art. 21.1.1.
14. Bal, supra note 11, at 67-69. Bal suggests the reinterpretation of Article XX so
that the "balance is in favor of non-trade issues. Id., at 108. This treatment would
require giving human rights, including labor and environmental rights, much broader
treatment under Article XX than is currently provided by GATT/WTO jurisprudence,
a highly unlikely development giving the extreme reluctance of most WTO Members
to discuss labor issues at all in the WTO context.
15. Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, available at http:/
/www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist_e/min0le/mindecl-e.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2011), para. 31 (trade and the environment). See also, e.g., Tarek F. Maassarani,
WTO-GATT, Economic Growth and the Human Rights Trade-Off, SPG ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L & POL'Y J. 269 (2005) (attacking "neo-liberalism instrumentalism, or the
proposition that free trade can advance human rights").
16. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948, Dec. 10, 1948), art. 23 [hereinafter "UDHR"].
2011]
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UDHR provisions are more honored in the breach than in the
observance, they are generally recognized as the obligations of
states under customary international law. The rights to freedom
of association and to join trade unions are also reiterated in the
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17 The
U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights provides most of the same "rights" albeit in somewhat dif-
ferent phraseology: non-discrimination in wages, safe and healthy
working conditions, the right to form trade unions, and the right
to strike, among others."i
The ILO, founded in 1919, considers as its mission and objec-
tive "promoting social justice and internationally recognized
human and labour rights, pursuing its founding mission that
labour peace is essential to prosperity." 9 The ILO's internation-
ally recognized human and labor rights include a declaration of
the "core" labor rights of freedom of association and the right to
collective bargaining; elimination of forced labor; abolition of child
labor; and elimination of employment discrimination.2" These are
considered fundamental rights and must be respected by all mem-
bers.21 It is, thus, no surprise that they have been incorporated in
one form or another in all of the Bush era FTAs, as discussed in
detail in Part III.
The correlation between human rights and environmental
rights is more diffused and continues to develop, although the con-
nection between environmental justice and human rights is evi-
dent.22 The issue is complicated because, unlike labor rights,
environmental rights are not generally seen as running directly to
individuals, with international environmental agreements other
than most of the U.S. FTAs providing "little direct recourse to
individual victims of environmental harm."23 Multilateral envi-
17. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 22.1; ratified by the United States Jun. 8,
1992 [hereinafter "UNCCPR"].
18. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States is not a party. But more than
160 nations have ratified the Covenant [hereinafter "UNCESCR"].
19. ILO, About the ILO, Mission and objectives, available at http://www.ilo.org/
global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2010).
20. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up, Jun. 18, 1998 as amended Jun. 15, 2010, available at http://www.ilo.org/
declarationlthedeclaration/textdeclarationlang-enlindex.htm (last visited Dec. 23,
2010).
21. Id., para. 2.
22. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model
for International Environmental Rights, 24 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 71. 80-86. (2005).
23. Caroline Dommen, How Human Rights Norms Can Contribute to
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ronmental agreements ("MEAs") focus primarily on "constraining
environmentally deleterious behavior, rather than preventing
injuries to people."24 Nevertheless, as one scholar has noted, there
is a "synergy" between human rights and environmental rights,25
and a "substantial and synergistic confluence" between human
rights law and environmental law has developed over the past
twenty years.26 The overlap is reflected in the 1992 Rio Declara-
tion, which provides in its first principle that "[h]uman beings are
at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature."27
Logically, the human rights to life2' and health,29 even if consid-
ered secondary human rights by some, are also reasonably charac-
terized as human rights, as they subsume the right to clean water,
breathable air and adequate sanitation. One can posit that for
many of the approximately three billion human beings living on
less than two dollars a day, there is much less concern with basic
human rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press
and the right to participate in governance than with the elusive
"rights" to clean water, clean air, and sanitation, rights which
would significantly decrease the likelihood that one's child dies of
dysentery or intestinal parasites. 0
Environmental Protection: Some Practical Possibilities Within the United Nations
System, in LINKING HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 105 (Romina Picolotti &
Jorge Daniel Taillant, eds., 2003).
24. Osofsky, supra note 22, at 78.
25. Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic
Melting: a Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental
Human Rights, 26 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3, 19 (2007).
26. George Pring & Catherine Pring, Specialized Environmental Courts and
Tribunals at the Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment, 11 OR. REV. INT'L
L. 301, 305 (2009).
27. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Jun. 14, 1992, 31 L.M. 874 (1992), also available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=
1163 (last visited Dec. 22, 2010), Principle 1 (emphasis supplied).
28. UDHR, art. 3; UNCCPR, art. 6.1; this article has been interpreted by some to
support those who believe that life begins at the moment of conception, although that
conclusion does not appear to be required by the language of the article.
29. UNCESCR, supra note 17, art. 11 ("continuous improvement of living
conditions"); art. 12.1 ("enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health").
30. See Paul Stoller, Social Upheaval and the Structure of Poverty in Africa, Feb.
2, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-stoller/social-upheaval-and-
the-s.b_- 817481.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (describing life in Africa at under $2
per day, without running water, indoor plumbing or any source of clean drinking
water, leading to gastrointestinal diseases, parasites and skin infections for your
children and other threats to life itself, such as food shortages and malnutrition).
2011] 303
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The fact that the connection between human rights and the
environment is still evolving is reflected in the Aarhus Conven-
tion, in which the Parties recognize in the Preamble "that ade-
quate protection of the environment is essential to human well-
being and the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the
right to life itself .... ,,31 The Convention itself is focused on devel-
oping environmental justice (rights, inter alia, to information, par-
ticipation in environmental decision-making, and the right to
access to courts to challenge the failure of states to comply)."
While the Convention, now in force, 33 is open to accession only by
the members of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, many
of the procedural requirements of the Convention are reflected in
different form in the North American Agreement on Environmen-
tal Cooperation (under NAFTA) and in the subsequent Bush era
FTAs3
Still, the dichotomy between "hard" human rights law that
encompasses labor rights and the "soft" law that connects human
rights to environmental rights and protection is not the most
important consideration when one is dealing with FTAs. It is not
necessary to build soft law into customary international law, or
discuss the scope of general principles (because existing agree-
ments are extremely general). Rather, in this analysis, we focus
on provisions of bilateral, trilateral (NAFTA) or regional (CAFTA-
DR) trade agreements that incorporate detailed rights and obliga-
tions, are legally binding on the Parties and are subject to
mandatory, if imperfect, implementation procedures and dispute
settlement mechanisms.
For example, as discussed in detail in Part III, virtually all of
the U.S. FTAs, beginning with NAFTA, call for providing citizens
of the Parties with opportunities for access to some kind of mecha-
nism for addressing violations of the labor and environmental
(and many other) obligations agreed to by the Parties. Those
rights/causes of action are often so constrained (or limited to
national government action) as to be non-functional, and thus, in
many instances, are reasonably considered inadequate and
31. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Jun. 25, 1998, available at http:ll
www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
32. Id., arts. 5-9; see Pring & Pring, supra note 26, at 306-08 (discussing the
Convention).
33. As of Oct. 30, 2001; see UNECE, Introducing the Aarhaus Convention,
available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
34. See discussion in Part III, infra.
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largely ineffective. But they exist nevertheless and in many
respects go beyond what is available elsewhere, particularly with
regard to environmental rights, which, unlike labor rights, do not
provide injured individuals access to a variety of specialized tribu-
nals. In particular, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, which celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2009, promotes
structural reforms in human rights laws and their implementa-
tion throughout the Western Hemisphere and has evaluated
thousands of individual petitions, more than 10,000 in the years
2002-2008 alone, typically providing individual review ("process-
ing") of over one hundred per year.35
In addition, both the NAFTA "side" agreements and the labor
and environmental provisions of subsequent agreements, such as
CAFTA-DR and the Peru PTA, incorporate formal and informal
institutions and procedures for furthering labor and environmen-
tal goals (including better laws and regulations) through coopera-
tive activities, dissemination of information to the public and
mutual efforts to improve national labor and environmental laws
and regulations. Although to succeed such mechanisms depend,
inter alia, on staffing and funding levels, they offer at least the
possibility of significant change and improvement. Binding inter-
national agreements alone cannot assure that an FTA Party will
observe the provisions of the agreement related to rule of law (or
others for that matter), but the text may afford one Party leverage
over another Party and the option of formal consultations and dis-
pute settlement that would not be present otherwise, even without
having to use the government-to-government dispute settlement
provisions.
In the final analysis, compliance is in the hands of the
national governments.36 Moreover, one may hope that govern-
ments that are prepared to comply in good faith with the obliga-
tions they have entered into with regard to the trade and
commercial aspects of an FTA would be prepared to do the same
with the labor and environmental provisions. Those provisions
embody, particularly in the Bipartisan Trade Deal ("BTD") form,
many of the same administrative transparency and procedural
due process requirements as are applied to trade and commercial
transactions under the agreements. If-and this is an enormous
35. IACHR, Annual Report 2009, Introduction, Chapter III B (c), (e) (statistics),
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.I.eng.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2011).
36. Powell, supra note 7, at 70-71.
2011] 305
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"if'-the United States complies with the labor and environmen-
tal FTA provisions, and provides adequate funding and technical
support to its developing country partners, the other Parties may
ultimately regard compliance with environmental and labor obli-
gations as important as compliance with trade obligations under
the agreements.
At the same time, if none of the Parties is prepared to make
the mechanisms work as intended, as with the financially starved
and politically beleaguered Commission and Secretariat under
NAAEC, there is little chance that the provisions will contribute
significantly to improving respect for labor rights and environ-
mental quality in the affected Parties. So far, the provisions of
U.S. FTAs relating to trade and to environment afford opportuni-
ties for major improvements in the observance of labor rights and
environmental protection in the nations that are parties to the
agreements, although, such opportunities have yet to be fully
realized.
III. LABOR AND ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER US FTAs
The evolution of labor and environmental rights in U.S. free
trade agreements is a process that has taken place in a non-linear
manner over a sixteen year-period from the NAFTA negotiations
beginning in 199111 to the modifications in the text of the Peru
TPA in mid-2007. In this section, I discuss this evolution with
particular focus on the texts. Throughout, the process reflects a
relatively constant tension between opposing points of view,
between those favoring the inclusion of strong labor rights and
environmental provisions in FTAs and those believing, with equal
fervor, that incorporation of such protections in trade agreements
is misplaced.
The inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in U.S.
FTAs was not a foregone conclusion; it was mostly an afterthought
in relation to NAFTA, as explained below. None are found in the
pre-NAFTA agreements with Israel and. However, in the United
States, the relationship between trade and labor was well-estab-
lished prior to NAFTA through non-reciprocal programs such as
the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"),38 the Caribbean
37. The first U.S. FTA, negotiated with Israel in 1985, was a relatively short
document and contained no labor or environmental provisions. See Gantz, RTAs,
supra note 3, at 208-18.
38. See, e.g. U.S. legislation authorizing the GSP program, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461 et
seq. (expired Dec. 31, 2010).
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Basin Initiative ("CBI"), 39 and more recently with the Andean
Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act ("ATPDEA")4 ° and the
African Growth and Opportunity Act ("AGOA").41 These unilat-
eral programs, which are based on legislation rather than interna-
tional agreements, lack permanency because, by their terms, they
may expire, as happened most recently with GSP on December 31,
2010 and ATPDEA in mid-February 2011.
The United States has traditionally offered such programs to
"beneficiary developing countries" only under terms of condition-
ality. To be eligible for GSP,
A GSP beneficiary must have taken or is taking steps to
afford internationally recognized worker rights, including
1) the right of association, 2) the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively, 3) freedom from compulsory labor, 4) a
minimum age for the employment of children, and 5)
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work and occupational safety and health
42
The World Bank and other international financial institu-
tions have in recent years made financial assistance similarly con-
ditional on observation of ILO core labor standards and on
principles of sustainable development.43 Thus, there appears to be
an increasing appreciation of what seems obvious in retrospect: if
steps are taken to increase trade through RTAs or other mecha-
nisms, there will be significant impacts on workers and on the
environment, particularly in nations where RTA membership is
designed to and succeeds in generating investment, jobs and
exports.
39. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707.
40. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201 et seq. (2009).
41. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3739 (2006).
42. USTR, U.S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook (Jan. 2010), at 20
(citing 19 USC §2462(b)(2), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/1597 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011). "A GSP beneficiary must implement any commitments it
makes to eliminate the worst forms of child labor." Ibid.
43. See Tonia Novitz, Core Labour Standards Conditionalities: A Means by Which
to achieve Sustainable Development, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW,
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Julio Faundez & Celine Tan, eds.,
Edward Elgar Publishers, 2010) 234, 242 (commenting on the practice of labor rights
conditionality by various countries and the international financial institutions).
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A. NAFTA, the Environment and Labor4
The environment and labor provisions of NAFTA, including
but not limited to the two "side" agreements, are unique in several
respects. At the time NAFTA was negotiated by the George H.W.
Bush Administration in 1991-1992 and modified by the Clinton
Administration in 1993, these negotiations were among the first
efforts to address environment and labor issues in an FTA, first in
the body of NAFTA itself, and later with the separate North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), 45 the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
("NAAEC"), 46 the Agreement creating the North American Devel-
opment Bank ("NADBank") and the Border Environment Cooper-
ation Commission ("BECC").4' These first efforts represent an
approach which, although changed by the United States in favor
of incorporation of the labor and environmental provisions in the
body of the FTA rather than in separate agreements, continues to
affect RTAs concluded by the United States.
Even though NAFTA itself contained initially only limited
environmental provisions, it accomplished what the WTO Agree-
ments did not achieve; it established an order of precedence in
relation to the three major MEAs, and two regional agreements.4 s
44. This discussion of NAFTA provisions on the environment and labor is adapted
from Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 146-151.
45. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), Sep. 14, 1993,
available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (last visited Jan. 10,
2011) [hereinafter "NAALC"]
46. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC"), Sep.
14, 1993, available at http://www.cec.orglPage.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodelD=567
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
47. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border
Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank,
Nov. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545 (1994), also available at http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/
Charter 2004_Eng.pdf (last visited Jul. 24, 2007).
48. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, Mar. 3, 1973, amended Jun. 22, 1979, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/
disc/text.shtml (last visited May 13, 2008); Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16, 1987, amended Jun. 29, 1990, available at http://
www.unep.orgIOZONE/pdfsfMontreal-Protocol2000.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008);
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e-rev.doc
(last visited May 13, 2008); Agreement Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, La Paz, Aug. 14, 1983, available at http://untreaty.
un.org/unts/60001 120000/12/10/00022468.pdf (last visited May 13, 2008); Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of
America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Ottawa,
LABOR RIGHTS
Specifically, in the event that NAFTA provisions conflict with
three major MEAs, or two regional agreements, the provisions of
the MEAs prevail to the extent they are inconsistent with
NAFTA. 49
The side agreements were considered necessary when Presi-
dent Clinton succeeded President Bush in January 1993 after the
NAFTA had been negotiated and signed, but before it had been
submitted to Congress for approval. As a presidential candidate
in October 1993, then Governor Clinton boldly endorsed NAFTA,
but only on condition that NAFTA's environmental and labor pro-
visions be strengthened." Although those issues had been
addressed earlier in an environmental impact assessment, candi-
date and then President Clinton's decision was driven in part by
concerns of members of Congress and other elected officials on the
U.S. side of the Mexican border that without attention to potential
labor and environmental problems as part of the package working
and living conditions on both sides of the border would
deteriorate.51
Given the timing, and the reluctance of all Parties to reopen
discussions of an already concluded agreement, the most practical
solution was to negotiate one or more parallel agreements to
address NAFTA's perceived environmental and labor shortcom-
ings. Thus, the decision to treat labor and environmental issues
in separate agreements was driven by sequence and timing, and
not, as far as I have been able to determine, by any decision to
relegate such issues to an inferior status.
1. Environment-Related Provisions within NAFTA Itself
In addition to NAFTA's preambular language and the hierar-
chy giving MEAs priority over inconsistent NAFTA provisions,
Oct. 28, 1986, available at http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/bi-lateral/2.2X-CanXUS-
Tby.Haz.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
49. NAFTA, art. 104, annex 104.1. The provision also specifies that "where a
Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement." It applies only to MEAs in
force for all three NAFTA Parties; since the United States has not ratified the Basel
Convention that convention is effectively excluded from the list.
50. Gerald F. Seib, Clinton Backs the North American Trade Pact, But Candidates'
Stances on the Issue Aren't Clear, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2002, at A14.
51. See, e.g., The NAFTA: Report on Environmental Issues ES-1 (Nov. 1993) ("the
Promotion of trade and investment throughout the continent under the NAFTA has
potential effects on the physical environment and on environmental policies and
programs."
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NAFTA's chapters on sanitary measures and standards, unlike
their World Trade Organization counterparts, make explicit refer-
ence to "environmental conditions" and "the environment" as rele-
vant factors in risk assessment and legal justification of
standards, even where they affect international trade.52 Possibly
for the first time in an RTA, NAFTA contains provisions to protect
human, animal and plant health and safety and facilitates the use
of standards, including those designed for environmental pur-
poses, although subject to certain constraints. 5 The NAFTA
investment provisions preserve the parties' right to apply environ-
mental measures to firms operating within their territories, and
bar the relaxing of domestic safety, health or environmental (or
labor) standards as a means of attracting foreign investment.54
The NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism is, in theory,
mandatory where environmental disputes under NAFTA's provi-
sions are concerned, so that parallel World Trade Organization
remedies are not available.55 Also, the General Exceptions in
NAFTA, as noted earlier, make specific reference to permitting
"environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health," "conservation of exhaustible natural
resources" and barring imports made with prison labor.5"
2. North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
The NAAEC's objectives include protection and improvement
of the environment; promoting sustainable development; increas-
ing Party cooperation for conserving, protecting and enhancing
the environment; supporting NAFTA's environmental goals;
avoiding trade distortions or new trade barriers; strengthening
cooperation to develop and improve environmental rules and regu-
lations; enhancing compliance with environmental laws and regu-
52. NAFTA, arts. 715(1)(f), 903-907.
53. Id., ch. 7, part B; ch. 9.
54. Id., art. 1114.
55. Id., art. 2005. But see United States - Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, DS381, consultations requested Oct.
24, 2008 (where the United States has insisted, unsuccessfully, that the action should
have been brought under NAFTA rather than under the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding).
56. Id., art. 2101(1), incorporating GATT, art. XX(b), (g) and (e); see Raymond B.
Ludwiszewski & Peter E. Seeley, "Green" Language in the NAFTA: Reconciling Free
Trade and Environmental Protection, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Judith H.
Bello et al, eds. (ABA, 1994), at 375-385.
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lations; promoting transparency and public participation in the
development of environmental laws and regulations; promoting
economically efficient environmental measures; and promoting
pollution prevention policies and practices. 7 In the first instance,
this is to be accomplished by each Party's obligation to enforce its
environmental laws and regulations, provide private citizen
access to legal remedies, and assure procedural due process for
administrative and judicial proceedings. 8
The NAAEC is also designed to provide a mechanism for
requiring the NAFTA parties to enforce their own internal envi-
ronmental laws and regulations. Each Party, while maintaining
the right to establish its "own levels of environmental protection,"
is to "ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels
of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to
improve those laws and regulations." 9 The latter commitment is
not realistically enforceable, because NAAEC sets no substantive
environmental standards other than to call upon each Party to
"ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of
environmental protection." 0 Thus, nothing prevents a Party from
weakening its environmental laws, and then enforcing them at
the weakened level.
NAAEC creates a Commission for Environmental Coopera-
tion ("CEC") consisting of a Council and a semi-autonomous Secre-
tariat. 1 Located in Montreal, Canada, the CEC is authorized to
consider citizen complaints from private parties asserting failure
to enforce environmental laws, with investigatory powers and
authority to seek expert advice and issue reports. The Secreta-
riat has the authority to develop a "factual record" when the sub-
mission so warrants. Where the investigation demonstrates a
NAFTA Party's "persistent pattern of failure . . . to effectively
enforce its environmental laws," a process of binding consultation
and dispute resolution through an arbitral process is made availa-
ble.' This arbitral process, like the parallel process in the
NAALC and the mechanisms in all subsequent U.S. FTAs, is open
57. NAAEC, supra note 46, art. 1
58. Id., arts. 5-7.
59. Id., art. 3.
60. Id., art. 3.
61. Id., arts. 8-9.
62. Id., arts. 14-15.
63. Id., art. 15.
64. Id., art. 36.
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only to the government parties. 5 For the United States and Mex-
ico, an adverse arbitral decision with which the Party does not
comply could result in trade sanctions. For Canada, in lieu of
trade benefit suspension, a fine may be assessed and enforced in
the (U.S.) federal court.6' The process is clearly designed to
encourage voluntary compliance; suspension of trade benefits is
the last resort, occurring only after a complex and lengthy proce-
dure that can be initiated only with the agreement of two of the
three national representatives on the Commission.
While there have been more than sixty petitions filed with the
CEC, no series of matters has been taken to arbitration or sub-
jected to sanctions.67 This reflects the requirement that two of the
three governments must support the action and that only govern-
ments, not private parties, may initiate arbitration, as well as lack
of enthusiasm on the part of all Parties for responding to citizen
complaints. The principal value of the CEC/Secretariat mecha-
nism is likely to expose a NAFTA government's failure to enforce
its environmental laws in those cases in which the governments
(acting through the CEC) permit the Secretariat to develop a fac-
tual record of the matter, rather than to compel compliance, which
the Secretariat has absolutely no power to do. The Secretariat
also has the authority to undertake reports on matters within the
scope of its annual program, again with limitations that may be
imposed by the CEC"
The majority of cases brought and resolved before the CEC
were closed without the development of a factual record, usually
on the grounds that the issues are already being dealt with by the
national authorities or that the procedural requirements of the
NAAEC have not been met. For example, in Transgenic Maize in
Chihuahua, the Secretariat determined that the alleged violations
of Mexican environmental law pertaining to risk assessment of
growing transgenic maize were "indeed subject to a pending pro-
ceeding in Mexico," and as a result terminated the case. 9 Another
matter, Jetty Construction in Cancun, was dismissed because the
65. 'See, id., art. 24 (providing that a panel may be convened by the Council "on the
written request of any consulting Party .... ").
66. Id., annex 36A.
67. See CEC, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters, available at http:/!
www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=751&SiteNodeID=250 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011)
(listing and discussing each of the enforcement matters under NAAEC); NAAEC, arts.
24-36.
68. Id., art. 13.
69. CEC ID: SEM-09-001 (Mexico) (filed Jan. 28, 2009); see CEC decides not to
recommend the development of a factual record on Transgenic Maize in Chihuahua
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complainant's submission did not conform to procedural require-
ments.7" Nevertheless, there have been approximately sixteen
cases, or about 25% of the total, in which a factual record has been
developed, often without the responding Party's full cooperation,
and released to the public. 1
While the factual records have provided the public with
important information on the actions and omissions of the NAFTA
governments, it is difficult to determine the extent to which such
records have altered the behavior of the Parties. There are, how-
ever, a few success stories with the citizen submission process.
For example, some observers believe that a citizen submission
relating to the construction of a cruise ship pier at Cozumel, alleg-
ing Mexican government failure to enforce Mexican environmen-
tal law in the approval process, ultimately led to needed reforms
in Mexican environmental law.72
The CEC process for responding to citizen submissions is sub-
ject to both procedural and substantive flaws. Jay Tuchton has
suggested that in addition to the potential for significant delays,
the process is deficient because the complaining Party has little
opportunity to participate in the review process once a submission
has been made, and has no access to the response of the NAFTA
Party being challenged. 3 With regard to substance, even if the
submitter of the complaint is successful in meeting the procedural
requirements of the NAAEC causing the Council and Secretariat
to create a factual record that is made public, there is still no
submission, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=3155
&SiteNodeID=532&AASiteLanguageID=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 1011).
70. CEC ID: SEM-08-003(Mexico) (filed Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.
cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2410&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandlD=
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
71. See Cozumel, CEC ID: SEM-96-001(Mexico) (filed Jan. 17, 1996), available at
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2346&SiteNodeID=550&BL_
ExpandID= (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (explaining that the factual record after
approval of the CEC was released in October 1997); CEC, Factual Records, available
at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=924&SiteNodeID=543 (last visited Jan. 10,
2011) (listing the cases in which factual records were developed).
72. Chris Wold, Evaluating NAFTA and the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation: Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade
Agreements, 28 ST. Louis PUB. L. REV. 201, 226 (2008) [hereinafter "Wold, NAAEC"].,
I citing Gustavo Alanis Ortega, Public Participation within NAFTA's Environmental
Agreement: The Mexican Experience in Linking Trade, Environment and Social
Cohesion, in NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183, 184-185 (John J. Kirton
& Virginia W. MacLaren, eds., 2002).
73. Jay Tuchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA's Environmental Side
Agreement: It's Easy to Use but Does it Work?, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10018, __ (1996).
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guarantee that the Party will change its practices.74
However, there are also more fundamental problems with the
manner in which the NAAEC process has been implemented by
the NAFTA Parties. As Chris Wold has noted,
The rigorous and professional manner in which the Secre-
tariat has reviewed submissions has been instrumental in
ensuring the integrity of the process. Nonetheless, actions
and decisions of the Council have eroded public confidence
in the process, leading the former director of the CEC's unit
on Submissions on Enforcement Matters to declare that the
submissions process-frequently referred to as the "teeth"
of the NAAEC-suffers from "tooth Decay."75
In particular, "It]he Council has sought to whittle away at the
independence of the Secretariat by determining the scope of pro-
posed factual records, a role designated to the Secretariat."76 With
regard to one submission, where the submitters requested the
Secretariat to prepare a factual record regarding the failure of the
United States to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against
logging interests, and where the Secretariat agreed that prepara-
tion of the factual record was warranted based on the evidence
provided, the CEC nevertheless sharply limited the scope of the
factual record to two examples, effectively barring review of any of
the many other examples submitted by the applicants.7
The restrictive approach of the CEC, in which it regularly
undermines the citizen submission process, has continued into the
Obama Administration. The environmental coalition Ecojustice
recently withdrew a complaint against Canada. The complaint,
filed in 2006, alleged that Canada had failed to protect some 197
species at risk under Canadian law.7" In January 2011, the CEC
decided to investigate this complaint, but limited the investigation
to only 11 species and otherwise narrowed the issues. An Ecojus-
74. Ibid. See also DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZALKE,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1275-87 (4th ed., Foundation Press,
2010) (discussing the operation of the NAAEC).
75. Wold, NAAEC, supra note 72, at 228.
76. Id.
77. Id.., at 228-229; see CEC Secretariat, Article 15(1) Notification to Council that
Development of a Factual Record is Warranted, A14/SEM/99-002/1IIADV (Dec. 15,
2000), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2011).
78. Ecojustice, Species-at-risk defenders walk away from NAFTA review process,
Jan. 17, 2011, available at http://www.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/press-releases/
species-at-risk-defenders-walk-away-from-nafta-review-process (last visited Jan. 17,
2011).
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tice representative protested that the CEC action "tells you that
the citizen submissions process, touted by NAFTA promoters as
the way to ensure the environment isn't trampled by free trade, is
a sham."  In sort, the citizen complaint process is still being
treated "as an adversarial, rather than a cooperative, process."8"
The CEC and Secretariat, with officials who are well qualified
to engage in technical analysis and research, have had significant
accomplishments through cooperative work programs and data
collection, as authorized by NAAEC.8 The governments have used
the CEC, albeit cautiously, to collaborate on various environmen-
tal issues, such as trade flows of used electronics for proper dispo-
sal, encouraging "green" buildings and "greening" the region's
transportation corridors. 2 For example, the CEC has issued a
number of important reports and "North American Regional
Action Plans," particularly with regard to toxic chemicals.8 3
The CEC and Secretariat also produced "North American
Environment Outlook to 2030," a report that "summarizes recent
research concerning the major forces and underlying trends that
are likely to shape the [North American] environment of North
America in 2030. "1 The CEC maintains a North American Envi-
ronmental Atlas, which furnishes on-line information on environ-
mental issues on a continent-wide basis. 5 This is only one feature
of an excellent website that is well maintained despite CEC's
chronic shortage of funds.
The original 1994 budget of $9 million annually has never
been increased. It must continue to cover all CEC's activities
including the processing of citizen complaints, compilation of fac-
tual records and production of reports, even though it has never
been increased, 6 In real terms, $9 million today is worth far less
79. Ibid.
80. Wold, Evaluating NAAEC, supra note 72, at 232.
81. See NAAEC, arts. 10 (council functions), 13 (secretariat reports).
82. Joint Statement, Meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Jan. 10,
2011 (Mexico City), at 2, available at http://www.economia.gob.mx/swb/work/models/
economiafResource/1350/1/images/Joint StatementFinal_1Ene 2011.pdf (last
visited Jan. 11, 2011).
83. Wold, NAAEC, at 226-227.
84. CEC, Jul. 2010, at 11, available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/64/9458-Out
look203Oen.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
85. Available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=924&SiteNodelD=495&AA-
SiteLanguageID=l (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
86. Wold, NAAEC, supra note 72, at 227; See CEC, Operational Plan of the
Commission for environmental Cooperation (2010), at 5 (showing the Parties'
aggregate contributions at US$9 million), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/85/
8126_OperationalPlan_2010_en.pdf ) (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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and supports far fewer activities than it did in 1994. More ade-
quate funding would undoubtedly increase the ability of the CEC
to fulfill its analysis and research functions, as well as functions
related to responding to citizen submissions.
More generally, the NAAEC has also been criticized for failing
to provide any minimum standard of environmental protection in
the Parties' laws and regulations and for near impossibility of
reaching a minimum level of enforcement of environmental viola-
tions. With regard to the former, it was probably impossible to
consider specific standards without risking a "lowest common
denominator" effect (a compromise among the Parties that would
provide less environmental protection for some Parties than that
afforded under then-effective domestic laws). With regard to the
latter, it remains to be seen whether subsequent U.S. FTAs, which
at least on paper provide for enforcement of persistent patterns of
environmental violations under the general dispute settlement
provisions of the FTA, but do not have CEC equivalents, will be
more effective in encouraging enforcement of national environ-
mental laws than the NAAEC.
In Canada, NAAEC applies only to the federal government.
NAAEC will not apply to the provinces' environmental laws and
regulatory actions unless and until provinces representing more
than 55% of the Canadian population have separately accepted an
inter-governmental agreement concluded in 1995. Despite the
passage of nearly seventeen years and the location of the CEC in
Montreal, only Alberta, Quebec and Manitoba have signed on.87
3. NADBank and BECC
In November 1993, without the participation of Canada, the
United States and Mexico established a pair of little known and
under-appreciated institutions, the North American Development
Bank ("NADBank") and the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission ("BECC"). These entities are intended to facilitate
investment in environmental infrastructure in the border region."8
The NADBank, with paid-in capital of $450 million after the five
initial years and total authorized capital of $3 billion, was
designed to furnish "seed" money for border environmental infra-
87. NAAEC Canadian Office, Canadian Implementation, available at http://www.
naaec.gc.ca/englimplementation/implementatione.htm (last visited May 13, 2008).
88. The NADBank/BECC Agreement also incorporates a little-used technical
assistance program, ch. II, art. I,§ 1(b).
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structure projects approved by the BECC. 9 The agreement con-
templates a bifurcated system with a development bank to fund
the projects and a separate (perhaps more "people-friendly")
entity, the BECC, to act as a liaison with state and local entities to
develop and certify worthy projects. As of September 2010, the
BECC had completed 101 environmental infrastructure projects
with an aggregate value of $1.68 billion, with NADBank financing
amounting to $563.2 million." Another 61 projects were in vari-
ous stages of construction, bidding or design, with a total cost of
$1.7 billion, of which NADBank financing amounts to $653
million.91
Although the NADBank and BECC were initially criticized
for moving too slowly in the process of certifying projects and pro-
viding funding, much of the problem was likely due to the inher-
ent nature of the mechanism. Many local governments lack the
expertise to develop projects that are technically sustainable. The
NADBank (which is in fact a bank even though a development
bank) finds some of the projects to be financially wanting. 2 From
the outset it was evident that financial viability would be a prob-
lem for designing projects, particularly in Mexico. In Mexico,
there is only limited history of payment of user fees for the provi-
sion of water and sewage services and neither country was willing
to contribute sufficient financial resources to allow the NADBank
to provide full grants rather than a combination of grants and
loans.93
Under such circumstances, most viable projects have been
funded through a combination of loans and government grants, so
that the annual fees would cover not only the loan servicing, but
operating costs as well. After a disappointing start in which the
initial proposed operating regulations were criticized in Congress
and elsewhere for being non-transparent, the BECC quickly cor-
rected the problem. In practice, the BECC has shown a greater
commitment to public participation and response to local needs
89. See 19 U.S.C. § 3473 (1993) -(authorizing the expenditure of funds for the
NADBank).
90. BECC, Quarterly Status Report, Sep. 30, 2010, at 10, available at http://www.
nadbank.org/publications.html#reports (last visited Jan. 10, 2011).
91. Id., at 12.
92. Moreno et al, Free Trade and the Environment: The NAFTA, The NAAEC, and
Implications for the Future, 12 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 405 (1999).
93. See David A. Gantz, The North American Development Bank and the Border
Environment Cooperation Commission: A New Approach to Pollution Abatement
Along the United States-Mexican Border, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1027, 1046-1056
(1996) (discussing the initial problems and prospects for the NADBank and BECC).
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and desires than most other government agencies on either side of
the border.14 Unfortunately for those supporting such mecha-
nisms, the NADBank and BECC have not been replicated in sub-
sequent U.S. FTAs.
4. NAFTA and Labor
NAFTA itself incorporates little coverage of labor issues
except for references in the Preamble to creating new employment
opportunities, improving working conditions and enhancing and
enforcing basic workers' rights. NAFTA also provides for tempo-
rary visitors for business purposes in Chapter 16, but does not fur-
ther deal with immigration related matters. A key objective of
NAFTA was job creation, reflecting Mexico's pressing need to cre-
ate about one million new jobs a year, and the shared (but usually
unstated) desire of both the United States and Mexico to reduce
illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. This objec-
tive is implicit, rather than explicit, in the Agreement, for obvious
political reasons.
The NAALC9  shares many similarities to NAAEC, but with
some differences that make it on the whole a somewhat weaker
mechanism. This differentiation likely resulted from the side
agreement negotiations, when mainstream environmental organi-
zations were prepared to support NAFTA if they were satisfied
with NAALC, while major U.S. labor organizations indicated to
the Clinton Administration that they would not support NAFTA
under any circumstances.
In NAALC, each Party retains the right to set and apply its
own labor standards. Each Party is also required to provide in its
laws for unspecified "high labor standards"96 and to enforce labor
rights through specified procedures, including citizen access to
authorities.97 NAALC also enumerates International Labor
Organization principles that the Parties are committed to encour-
aging, including freedom of association; protection of the right to
organize; the right to collective bargaining and to strike; prohibi-
tion of forced labor; protection for child labor; minimum employ-
ment standards; elimination of discrimination in employment;
equal pay for men and women; prevention of and compensation for
occupational injuries and illnesses; and protection of migrant
94. Id., at 1045-1046.
95. NAALC, supra note 45.
96. Id., art. 2.
97. Id., art. 42.
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workers.9"
NAALC provided initially for a Commission for Labor Cooper-
ation ("CLC"), again consisting of a Council of Ministers and a
Secretariat.99 The head of the CLC is an executive director chosen
for a three-year term; the position rotates among the three Par-
ties,"0 with a staff made up of individuals from all three coun-
tries."1 In addition to the trilateral CLC mechanism, each
NAFTA Party has established its own National Administrative
Office ("NAO") (now the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs), which
monitors labor rights issues in North America. The NAO/OTLA
principal functions include "receiving complaints about non-
enforcement of labor laws" by a NAFTA government."2 The NAO
may seek consultations with another NAO on matters relating to
the Agreement. 3 Any Party may request ministerial level consul-
tations, and, if necessary, request the convening of an Evaluation
Committee of Experts ("ECE"). The ECE is directed, after study
and analysis, which may include public hearings, to produce a
report for consideration by the ministers.'
The formal dispute settlement mechanism, which is solely
available to the governments like that of the NAAEC, may be uti-
lized only where there is a "persistent pattern of failure . . . to
effectively enforce enumerated labor standards." More signifi-
cantly, standards enforceable by arbitration are limited to occupa-
tional safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical
labor standards. '05 In other words, a denial of the right to organ-
ize a union would not be subject to arbitration. The first step of
the dispute settlement mechanism involves inter-governmental
consultations. Further, fact-finding and/or mediation by the CLC
may follow. If issues are not resolved at this point, a Party may
request arbitration, a step requiring a two-thirds vote of the CLC
for approval. 10 6 If an arbitral decision is rendered but the offend-
ing Party fails to comply, only then may trade benefits afforded to
the violating Party be suspended. ' °7 There have been no arbitra-
98. Id., annex 1.
99. Id., arts. 8-14.
100. Id., art. 12(1).
101. CLC, Secretariat, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/secretariat.shtml
(last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
102. NAALC, arts. 15-16, esp. 16.3.
103. Id., art. 21.
104. Id., arts. 22-23, 25-26.
105. Id., art. 27.1.
106. Id., arts. 28-29.
107. Id., art. 41.
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tions under these provisions.
A total of 38 public communications had been recorded
through 2008.108 The process for submission of citizen complaints
to the NAOs was frequently used in the early years of NAFTA but
has tapered off in recent years; there have been only two filings
since 2005.1°9 Several of the complaints filed with the various
NAOs for investigation have been the subject of ministerial con-
sultations. These submissions included filings with the Mexican
and U.S. NAOs concerning protection of migrant workers, freedom
of association, protection of the right to organize and to collective
bargaining, minimum employment standards, and prevention of
occupational injuries and illnesses along with compensation for
the same.110
In one example, in August 2007, a report was issued in
response to a complaint filed in 2005 by a group of Mexican labor
organizations charging that Mexico was failing to "enforce its
labor laws in connection with freedom of association and protec-
tion of the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and
the right to strike," and that the government had failed to "con-
duct required on-site inspections to detect and remedy labor law
violations concerning forced labor, child labor, minimum employ-
ment standards, employment discrimination, and occupational
safety and health.""' The OTLA recommended consultation with
the Mexican NAO on questions relating to enforcement of Mexican
labor laws by Mexican authorities, including inter alia, compli-
ance with procedural requirements, unwarranted delays, coordi-
nation between federal and state authorities, transparency,
inspections of workplaces and discriminatory practices, as identi-
fied in the report. 112
Here and elsewhere, the NAALC has had some success in
shedding light on labor violations in each of the NAFTA nations
through publicity and "soft" political pressure. A number of the
early cases, including those against Sony (relating to working con-
108. CLC, NAALC Communications and Results, 1994-2008, available at http:/
www.naalc.org/userfiles/file/NAALC-Public-Communications-and-Results-1994-2008.
pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
109. Id., at 1.
110. CLC, Annual Report 2002, at 6-9, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/
pdffAR02_engweb.pdf (last visited Jul. 27, 2007).
111. Public Report of Review of Office of Trade and Labor Affairs, Submission.
2005-03, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Aug. 31, 2007, at 3, available at http://new.naalc.org/
UserFiles/File/HidalgoReport-FINAL_08-31-2007.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
112. Id., at 5.
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ditions in Mexico,) GE-Honeywell (relating to obstacles to workers
seeking representation by independent labor unions in Mexico,)
and Wal-Mart (relating to the closure of plants to avoid unioniza-
tion in Quebec), all resulted in substantial publicity and some
improvement in the conditions in focus of the complaints.113 In
these instances, informal consultations among NAOs have likely
been as valuable as more formal mechanisms.
Yet, as one observer has noted,
[t]he scope and autonomy of the Secretariat... has always
been quite constrained, although it did some useful work in
its first few years. However, for all practical purposes it
now appears to have disappeared entirely as an indepen-
dent entity, having been absorbed into the U.S. NAO."4
Given the built-in limitations, it is not surprising that arbi-
tration has never occurred under the NAALC. Historically, it
appears that none of the three NAFTA Parties has made effective
utilization of NAALC a high priority, with the typical focus placed
on organizing conferences and seminars and producing research
publications instead of addressing citizen complaints."5
The NAALC, like the NAAEC, is not fully operational in
Canada. Although adopted by the federal government in 1995,
only Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec and Prince Edward Island have
approved the intergovernmental agreement to date."'
B. United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement" '
The FTA with Jordan was the only FTA negotiated by the
Clinton Administration, and is the only U.S. FTA concluded with-
out the benefit of "fast-track"/Trade Promotion Authority
("TPA")."18 In significant respects, the Jordan FTA is more similar
113. See Jonathan Graubert, "Politicizing" a New Breed of "Legalized"
Transnational Political Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of NAFTA's
Citizen Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 115-20 (2005).
114. Ruth Buchanan & Rusby Chaparro, International Institutions and
Transnational Advocacy: The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 157 (2008).
115. See, CLC, Bi-Annual Report, 2008-2009, at 6, available at http://new.naalc.org
userfiles/file/INFORME-ING%20051110(1).pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
116. See Folsom et al, at 625-626; Ian Robinson, The NAFTA Labour Accord in
Canada: Experience, Prospects and Alternatives, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 475, 477-482
(1995).
117. This section is adapted in part from Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 221, 227-29.
118. There may be others in the future. For example, although the United States-
Korea FTA was concluded under TPA, issues arise as to whether the modifications
agreed to in December 2010 in the form of an exchange of letters and agreed minutes
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in form and substance to the United States-Israel FTA, negoti-
ated almost fifteen years earlier, than to NAFTA. The Jordan
FTA consists of a preamble, nineteen articles, three annexes and a
variety of joint statements, memoranda of understanding and
various side letters. Still, by comparison with NAFTA and subse-
quent U.S. FTAs, such as those with Chile, Singapore, and
CAFTA-DR, each of which contains twenty or more chapters, the
Jordan FTA is a compact bare-bones package, presumably reflect-
ing the preference of the Clinton Administration for a somewhat
less detailed and comprehensive FTA than NAFTA.
The political complexities surrounding the negotiation and
U.S. implementation of the Jordan FTA were perhaps greater
than with any other U.S. FTA. Although there is no direct legal
relationship, the existence and timing of the Jordan FTA were
linked to the Middle East peace negotiations taking place simulta-
neously, a major foreign policy initiative of the Clinton Adminis-
tration, and to Jordan's support of the Oslo accords and peace with
Israel.119 The approval of the FTA by the U.S. Congress 2 °
occurred after more than a year of bickering over labor and envi-
ronmental provisions, just a few weeks after the September 11,
2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York. This was
anything but coincidence. (The Jordanian National Assembly
approved the agreement by acclimation in May 2001.121) As
reported at the time, the agreement was "intended to show U.S.
appreciation of Jordan's efforts in supporting the Mideast peace
process and in combating international terrorism ... The rush to
pass the Jordan trade pact illustrates how the Sept. 11 attacks
have recalibrated the politics of normally divisive issues such as
trade."122
Still, despite, or perhaps because of, the political overtones,
the Jordan FTA broke new ground.
will come within the strictures of TPA See Amy Tsui, USTR Issues Final Texts on
Korea Pacts, Setting Stage for Legislative Consideration, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
272 (Feb. 17, 2010).
119. See Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan (Israel-Jordan), Oct. 6, 1994, available at http://usembassy-israel.org.il/
publishlpeace/ijpeace.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
120. United States-Jordan Free Trade Area Implementation Act, P1. 107-43, 107th
Cong., 1st sess., 115 Stat. 2431, 19 U.S.C. § 2112 Note (2001).
121. Royal Decree, Official Gazette No. 4486, at 1664 (Apr. 1, 2001).
122. Warren Vieth & Janet Hook, Senate Passes Free-Trade Pact with Key Ally
Jordan, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sep. 25, 2001, at A-8.
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1. Environmental Protection Provisions
Article 5 represents the first instance in a U.S. FTA in which
broad environmental protection provisions have been directly
incorporated into the body of a trade agreement, making them
subject to the general dispute resolution provisions. Many of the
substantive obligations are a carry-over from either NAFTA itself
or from the NAAEC, as discussed in Part III-A above. The recog-
nition that it is "inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing
domestic environmental laws" and the obligation not to waive
such laws for that purpose,123 reflects similar language in
NAFTA.124 Also as in NAFTA, each Party retains the right to
establish its own levels of environmental protection, development
policies and priorities, while striving "to assure that its laws pro-
vide for high levels of environmental protection." '25
As discussed earlier, under the NAAEC, dispute settlement
could, in theory, be triggered when any Party requests consulta-
tions alleging "a persistent pattern of failure by the other Party to
effectively enforce its environmental law."126 The language of the
Jordan FTA is somewhat different, but similar in coverage: "A
Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws,
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a
manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of
entry into force of this Agreement."27 For each Party, the Jordan
FTA also preserves discretion over "investigatory, prosecutorial,
regulatory, and compliance matters and to make decisions regard-
ing the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities."
This approach effectively permits a "reasonable exercise of such
discretion." '28
Making environmental disputes subject to the general dispute
resolution mechanism (Article 17), rather than to the weaker
NAAEC mechanism, was a significant development. Neverthe-
less, it has had its limitations, even before the Bush Administra-
tion effectively agreed not to use it. First, as with the NAAEC,129 a
single violation or series of violations is not sufficient to trigger
123. JFTA, art. 5.1.
124. NAFTA, art. 1114(2).
125. JFTA, art. 5.2; NAAEC, art. 3.
126. NAAEC, supra note 46, art. 22.1.
127. JFTA, art. 5.3(a).
128. Id., art. 5.3(b).
129. See NAAEC, supra note 46, art. 24(1).
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dispute settlement; there must be a "sustained or recurring course
of action or inaction." Second, the violations must affect trade
between the Parties, although that concept is not defined in the
Agreement and has not been tested by litigation. Investment is
not discussed as there are no investment protection provisions in
the Jordan FTA, even though a measure that affects trade likely
affects investment as well. Investment is regulated in a separate,
contemporary U.S. - Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty, which
does not contain any environmental provisions.130
The Jordan FTA lacks any mechanism, whether bilateral or
national, for the submission and acceptance of citizen submissions
charging failure by either of the Parties to comply with their envi-
ronmental law and regulations.
Even this relatively limited effort to provide enforceable envi-
ronmental obligations provoked opposition in the Congress. In
part, the opposition was concerned (with good reason based on the
NAAEC experience) that the United States could well be the
respondent rather than the moving Party in environmental dis-
putes; others opposed the inclusion of such language in a trade
agreement at all. These factors significantly contributed to the
delay in U.S. approval of the Jordan FTA.13 ' The controversy also
demonstrates the challenges for the United States in exporting its
environmental (and labor) standards to countries that are not in
an economic position to be able to afford them.132 Even so, the
expanded level of environmental protection in the Jordan FTA
may well be "an important step forward in the continuing harmo-
nization of free trade and environmental protection policy."133
As with NAFTA, the United States completed an environmen-
tal review of the Jordan FTA.13 ' The review focused on trans-
130. United States - Jordan Bilateral Investment Treaty, Jul. 2, 1997, available at
http://www.jordanecb.org/pdf/Jordan-BIT.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
131. See Andrea N. Anderson, The United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement,
United States Chile Free Trade Agreement and the United States Singapore Free
Trade Agreement: Advancement of Environmental Preservation?, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 1221, 1227-1230 (2004) (providing an extensive discussion of Article 5 and the
controversy surrounding the inclusion of environmental provisions in the JFTA).
132. See Emily Harwood, The Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Free Trade and the
Environment, 27 WM. & M.ARY ENVTL. L. & POL'v REV. 509, 538 (2002).
133. Id., at 540.
134. Final Environmental Review of the Agreement on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (undated), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/BilaterallJordan/asset_upload-file64_5111.pdf (last visited Sep. 5,
2007). Jordan was also obligated to complete an environmental review for review by
the Joint Committee. JFTA, art. 15.2(f).
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boundary and global effects on trade in endangered species,
migratory birds and protected areas, and concluded that it had no
evidence to show an adverse effect on Jordan's record in these
areas.1 Jordan and the United States also concluded a separate
initiative on technical environmental cooperation between the two
countries. 136
2. Labor Provisions
The Labor rights obligations under the Jordan FTA are gener-
ally parallel to those relating to environmental obligations. The
United States and Jordan:
reaffirm their obligations as members of the International
Labor Organization ("ILO") and their commitments under
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and its follow-up. The Parties shall strive to
ensure that such labor principles and the internationally
recognized labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 are recog-
nized and protected by domestic law.137
The Paragraph 6 principles are the right of association; right
to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition on forced labor;
minimum employment age for children; and acceptable conditions
of work regarding minimum wages, work hours and occupational
safety and health. Even though the obligation is "strive" rather
than "shall," this language goes beyond prior trade agreements,
and undoubtedly reflects Clinton Administration efforts driven by
their organized labor constituency to incorporate more specific
labor provisions in FTAs. Nonetheless, the obligations remain con-
siderably weaker than those dictated by the Bipartisan Trade
Deal ten years later.
The labor provisions are also subject to normal dispute settle-
ment under the Jordan FTA. However, the focus in Article 6 as
shown above, in contrast to the NAALC, is on international labor
standards rather than on national labor laws, and the Parties are
to strive to ensure that their labor standards are "consistent with
the internationally recognized labor rights" specified in Paragraph
6.138 Most significantly, the labor provisions of the Jordan FTA
are, unlike the NAALC obligations, enforceable in Party-to-Party
135. Id., at 2.
136. Joshua Ruebner, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, Cong. Research Service,
May 1, 2001, at CRS-13.
137. JFTA, art. 6.1.
138. Id., art. 6.3.
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arbitration. There is no National Administrative Office or Com-
mission under the agreement or other mechanism for investigat-
ing citizen complaints. The "Joint Committee" that has general
jurisdiction under the agreement is empowered, inter alia, to con-
sider "enhanced opportunities to improve labor standards," if sug-
gested by either Party.139 As under the environmental provisions,
the Parties agree that it is "inappropriate to encourage trade by
relaxing domestic labor laws." 4 °
The record of public disputes under the labor (or the environ-
mental) provisions of the Jordan FTA since it became effective in
2002 is limited. In September 2006, the AFL-CIO and the
National Textile Association filed a complaint with the U.S. Gov-
ernment and demanded that it institute dispute settlement pro-
ceedings under the Agreement.'41 The complaint charged that
Jordan violated its commitment to promote core labor standards
by restricting union membership only to Jordanian nationals
working in the "qualified industrial zones" created under the
United States - Israel Free Trade Agreement in 1997.142 By this
limitation, Jordan has allegedly excluded hundreds of thousands
of foreign workers (such as those from Egypt, India and Sri
Lanka) from freedom of association or union representation.'
Other violations, including Jordan's failure to enforce its own
labor laws, were also alleged.
No formal dispute settlement proceedings appear to have
been initiated, although it seems likely that the issue was raised
at diplomatic levels not only by the United States, but also by the
EU and other Jordanian trading partners. In any event, the
Jordanian Government responded. In an official report issued
several years later detailing the extensive changes in Jordanian
labor laws, administration and enforcement, the Government of
Jordan acknowledged "that improvements in labour administra-
tion were necessary in the apparel industry and across the coun-
try. As a result, the Government committed itself to a long-term
139. Id., art. 6.5.
140. Id., art. 6.2.
141. AFL-CIO and National Textile Association Complaint under the U.S.-Jordan
FTA Labor Chapter: Executive Summary (Sep. 21, 2006), available at http://www.
aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/uploadJordanExecutiveSummary.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
142. Ministry of Labour, Labour Administration Compliance in Jordan: A Multi-
stakeholder Collaboration (Feb. 2008, at 10-11, available at http://www.jordan
embassyus.org/new/LabourAdministrationandComplianceinJordanFinalLT.pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter "Labour Administrative Compliance"].
143. AFL-CIO Complaint, supra note 141.
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comprehensive strategy to enhance labour administration and
labour law compliance nationwide, and to becoming a model of
labour compliance in the region."1" The collaborators included the
Canadian International Development Association, USAID, the
EU, the ILO and the World Bank's International Finance
Corporation.'45
C. 2002 Trade Promotion Authority and Agreements
with Chile, Singapore and CAFTA-DR
Because of the unusual approach to negotiation and enact-
ment of trade agreements in the United States through the so-
called "Trade Promotion Authority" ("TPA") (formerly "fast-track")
as described below, the Congress played a significant role in deter-
mining the content of the trade agreements negotiated by the
Bush Administration, including but not limited to provisions
relating to labor and the environment. As a practical matter, the
Bush Administration could not complete the negotiations with
Chile and Singapore that were initiated in the final days of the
Clinton Administration or pursue other subsequent FTAs without
TPA. The negotiation and enactment of TPA resulted in further
evolution of the U.S. approach to such addressing labor and envi-
ronmental concerns. TPA as interpreted by the Bush Administra-
tion is reflected in the FTAs with Singapore, Chile, CAFTA-DR,
Morocco, Bahrain, Australia and the initial versions of the agree-
ments with Peru, Panama, Colombia and South Korea. While
there are some variations in the labor and environmental provi-
sions of the first six such agreements, most are quite similar. The
focus of this section will be on relevant provisions in the CAFTA-
DR, in part because it is the only such agreement other than
NAFTA with a fully functioning environmental secretariat and
the ability to develop a factual record in response to citizen
submissions.
While neither President Bush nor President Obama have pos-
sessed TPA since 2007, should the Obama Administration decide
to move forward with any new trade negotiations to conclusion,
either as part of the Doha Development Round of WTO trade
144. Labour Administration Compliance, supra note 142, at 4.
145. Ibid.
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negotiations146 or with the Trans-Pacific Partnership,147 the Presi-
dent will necessarily have to seek such authority from Congress.
Such legislation in many respects, probably including the labor
and environmental provisions, will likely resemble the 2002 ver-
sion, as modified by the provisions of the Bipartisan Trade Deal
discussed below. (The three pending FTAs with South Korea,
Panama and Colombia were concluded by the Bush Administra-
tion before the expiration of the TPA, so their consideration by
Congress is subject to TPA constraints.)"'
1. General Considerations for Fast-Track and TPA
For practical reasons, most foreign governments are unwill-
ing to complete substantive trade negotiations with the United
States in the absence of "fast-track" provisions most recently
incorporated under the President's TPA. Under the version of
TPA in force through June 30, 2007, once the agreement was for-
mally submitted to Congress, Congress limited its authority to
casting only a "yes" or "no" vote on a trade agreement; Congress
could neither amend any provisions nor unduly delay considera-
tion of the agreement and the implementing legislation once the
President submitted it to Congress.'49 In the absence of TPA, Con-
gress has had the ability to demand amendment of a trade (or any
other) pending international agreement, so as to make the agree-
ment more attractive to Congress and inevitably less attractive to
the foreign governments, 150 or Congress may have simply delayed
action indefinitely. Foreign governments want to avoid both of
these negative effects. 5
146. See WTO Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.wto.
org/englisldthewto-e/minist-e/min0l-e/mindecl-e.htm (setting out the initial agenda
for the negotiations).
147. See White House, Trans-Pacific Partnership: Progress Toward a Regional
Agreement, Nov. 13, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2010/1 1/13/trans-pacific-partnership-progress-towards-a-regional-agreement (last
visited Jan. 329, 2011) (reporting on the November 2010 negotiating session).
148. For reasons explained in the text, infra, the applicability of the TPA provisions
to the FTA with Colombia is uncertain. There is no significant doubt as to the other
three.
149. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(2) (Supp. 2002).
150. See Leslie Alan Glick, World Trade After September 11, 2001: The U.S.
Response, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 637-38 (2002) (discussing Congress' opposition,
on constitutional and other grounds, to TPA because of limitations on congressional
power).
151. The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations most clearly illustrated this
problem, when Congress declined to vote on two of the major negotiated components
(including a new Antidumping "Code"), prompting anger by the European
Communities and a pledge that they would not negotiate again with the United
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In return for the agreement by the House and Senate to limit
debate and to conduct only an up-or-down vote without the possi-
bility of amendments, the legislation imposed detailed substantive
criteria on the President for conducting trade negotiations. In
addition, TPA (along with certain provisions of the House and
Senate rules) required the President to obtain permission, in a
process that effectively permits a congressional veto, before he
may negotiate each specific agreement. 15 2 Also, consultations with
Congress were required throughout the negotiating process.5 '
Additionally, an environmental impact assessment was required,
as were a series of trade advisory committee reports, including but
not limited to labor and environmental issues."5
With one exception, a president has never sent an FTA to
Congress knowing that there was a strong likelihood that it would
be disapproved.155 However, Bush Administration officials became
frustrated when the Democratic Congress in late 2007 and early
2008 effectively stalled the FTAs with Panama, Colombia and
South Korea by implicitly or explicitly threatening disapproval.
Accordingly, President Bush decided to send the Colombia FTA
forward to Congress without having consulted on implementing
legislation and despite uncertainties about whether there were
States without assurances that such a result would not recur. C. Fred Bergsten,
Trade Has Saved America from Recession, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d87f2158-46a4-lldd-876a-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_
check=1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
152. 19 U.S.C. § 3803 (Supp. 2002).
153. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002). Also, the agreement had to be
presented to Congress at least ninety days before either the President or his delegate
may sign it. Congressional consideration would not begin until the President
transmitted the final agreement to Congress. The completed agreement, when
transmitted to Congress, was to be accompanied by a complete draft of the
implementing legislation and a "Statement of Administrative Action" explaining what
changes in U.S. laws were required, and demonstrating the agreement's consistency
with the negotiating objectives stated in the TPA legislation. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a)(1)(C)
(Supp. 2002). TPA also provided for a study by the U.S. International Trade
Commission ("USITC") of the economic impact of each FTA on the United States.
With regard to labor and environmental language in trade agreements, TPA directed
the President to create consultative mechanisms (advisory committees) to promote
respect for core ILO labor standards and for protection of the environment and human
health. Consultations with prospective FTA partners were also required, with the
provision of technical assistance if needed, and various review and reporting
requirements. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c) (Supp. 2002).
154. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(c), 3804(e) (Supp. 2002).
155. Arguably, the decision to send CAFTA-DR to the Congress was almost as big a
gamble; it ultimately passed the House of Representatives by only two votes. See
Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 162-163 (discussing the "near defeat" of CAFTA-DR due
to strong Democratic Party opposition, primarily to the labor and environmental
provisions).
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sufficient votes for enactment.15 The immediate, unprecedented,
but predictable Congressional reaction was to change the rules of
the House of Representatives, obviating the need to vote on the
Colombia FTA within ninety legislative days and permitting the
House to vote on the FTA at a time of its own choosing instead."7
2. Negotiating Objectives of TPA
The "Trade Negotiation Objectives" in the Trade Act of 2002
were designed to guide U.S. trade policy and represented a com-
promise between Congress (reflecting NGO and labor union mis-
givings) and President Bush (probably reflecting the predominant
views of the business community). They were applicable to trade
agreements negotiated beginning August 6, 2002, and signed by
March 31, 2007.158 That group included the then-ongoing Chile,
Singapore, and WTO negotiations, the since-abandoned Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas negotiations,' and subsequent
FTAs concluded within ninety days before June 30, 2007, the day
TPA expired.6 0 The latter group included FTAs with Australia,
Bahrain, CAFTA-DR, Colombia, Morocco, Oman, Panama and
South Korea. The focus in this discussion is on the labor and the
environment requirements, among the most controversial provi-
sions.' Among the listed "Overall trade negotiating objectives"
were the following:
"(5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are
mutually supportive and to seek to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the international means of doing
so, while optimizing the use of the world's resources;
(6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of
children consistent with core labor standards of the ILO...
156. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement
(Apr. 7, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/04/07/AR2008040700999 pf.html) (announcing his intention to
send the FTA immediately to Congress so as to force a vote by the end of the session).
157. House Approves Fast-Track Rules Change for U.S.-Colombia FTA, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Apr. 11, (2008). TPA "expressly recognizes the constitutional right of either
House to change the rules" (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any
time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House. 19
U.S.C. § 3805(c)(2) (Supp. 2002). That is what the House did.
158. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802-3803 (Supp. 2002).
159. See Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 263-72.
160. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3805, 3806 (Supp. 2002).
161. Others included investment protection.
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and an understanding of the relationship between trade
and worker rights ....
(7) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which par-
ties to those agreements strive to ensure that they do not
weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic envi-
ronmental and labor laws as an encouragement for trade;
[and]
(9) to promote universal ratification and full compliance
with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labor."
16 2
In addition to these general negotiating objectives, which
leave room for considerable negotiating discretion, specific negoti-
ating authority was incorporated, inter alia, for labor and environ-
mental objectives. This reflected the fact that the most
controversial of all FTA-related discussions in the United States
in recent years, as discussed with regard to the United States-
Jordan FTA earlier, have been over whether U.S. trade agree-
ments should include provisions relating to labor and the environ-
ment and, if so, what content should be incorporated in the
agreements. Congressional and private opinions have varied
widely, from opposing such provisions entirely to seeking assur-
ances that any violations of trade or environmental standards are
punished in the same manner as any other violations of the FTAs
and that strict labor and environmental standards are included in
the FTA texts."6 3 Many Republicans who found the language dic-
tated in TPA overly strong likely supported the compromise
because of the perceived need of the Bush administration to have
the necessary trade agreement negotiating authority.
The actual text favored the generally limited coverage of labor
162. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (Supp. 2002).
163. See, e.g., MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JORDAN-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: LABOR IssuEs, 2-4 (2001), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/
govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-2030:l; Andrea N. Anderson, The United States
Jordan Free Trade Agreement, United States Chile Free Trade Agreement and the
United States Singapore Free Trade Agreement: Advancement of Environmental
Preservation?, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1221, 1221-22 (2004); Emily Harwood, Note, The
Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Free Trade and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 509, 509 (2002); Marley L. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One
Step Back-Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA,
Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 689, 689-
701 (2003).
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and the environment espoused by the Republicans over the
broader coverage preferred by some Democrats:
"The principal negotiating objectives of the United States
with respect to labor and the environment are-
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the
United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environ-
mental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the United States and that party after entry into
force of a trade agreement between those countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain
the right to exercise discretion with respect to investiga-
tory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and
to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to
enforcement with respect to other labor or environmental
matters determined to have higher priorities, and to recog-
nize that a country is effectively enforcing its laws if a
course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of
such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision regard-
ing the allocation of resources, and no retaliation may be
authorized based on the exercise of these rights or the right
to establish domestic labor standards and levels of environ-
mental protection;
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards... ;
(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to protect the environment through the promotion
of sustainable development;
(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies
that unduly threatens sustainable development;
(F) to seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs
and nontariff barriers, for United States environmental
technologies, goods, and services; and
(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety
policies and practices of the parties to trade agreements
with the United States do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate against United States exports or serve as dis-
164. 106 "The term 'core labor standards' means- (A) the right of association; (B)
the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use of any form
of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health." 19 U.S.C. §3813(6) (Supp. 2002).
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guised barriers to trade."165
The limiting provisions in paragraphs A and B reflect similar lan-
guage in the NAALC. TPA's vague language allowed President
Bush to incorporate language on labor issues in FTAs without any
binding obligations to include them in national law and to enforce
core labor standards. This approach was unsatisfactory to many
members of Congress and other labor rights advocates, as the sub-
sequent BTD changes indicate.
The debate is reflected in the opposing positions of Demo-
cratic Senator Baucus and Republican Senator Grassley, both of
whom acted as the Finance Committee Chairman in recent years.
Baucus objected to the Chile FTA, because it did not meet the
standard for labor rights provisions established in the Jordan
FTA.'66 Grassley argued that "[s]ome members of Congress [i.e.,
Baucus] are even arguing that future agreements must follow the
'Jordan Standard.... '167 Grassley had earlier contended that the
TPA provisions were designed to preserve the flexibility of the
Executive Branch to take into account the situations in individual
FTA negotiating partners.
3. Environment and Labor in CAFTA-DR 168
While CAFTA-DR followed the completion of the FTAs with
Singapore and Chile by several years, the general approach to
labor and the environment reflected only relatively minor changes
from the earlier agreements. In Chapter 16 (labor) of CAFTA-DR,
the Parties must "strive to assure" that their laws are consistent
with their commitments under ILO agreements and with "core"
labor principles specified in Chapter 16.169 This language has been
criticized because it is not an absolute obligation, i.e., the provi-
sion does not say "shall assure..." as in the provisions of the Peru
TPA17° and other very recent U.S. FTAs. In addition, "[a] Party
shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sus-
tained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affect-
ing trade between the Parties .. ..' Furthermore, "[elach Party
retains the right to exercise discretion with respect to investiga-
165. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11) (Supp. 2002).
166. 148 CONG. REC. 19,121-22 (2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
167. 148 CONG. REC. 17,588 (2002).
168. Adapted from Gantz, RTAs, at 194-96.
169. Id., arts. 16.1 and 16.8.
170. See Part III(D), infra.
171. CAFTA-DR, art. 16.2(a).
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tory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters and to
make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforce-
ment with respect to other labor matters determined to have
higher priorities."172
Again, these consistent limitations reflect the fact that the
provisions of the FTAs are reciprocal, and experience under the
NAALC whereby U.S. as well as Mexican labor practices were
periodically challenged. Moreover, for the United States, "labor
laws" are effectively federal laws enforceable by the federal gov-
ernment,173 excluding state labor laws, regulations and enforce-
ment from the scope of CAFTA-DR.
CAFTA-DR requires creation of an office similar to the NAO:
"Each Party shall designate an office within its labor minis-
try that shall serve as a contact point with the other Par-
ties, and with the public, for purposes of carrying out the
work of the Council, including coordination of the Labor
Cooperation and Capacity Building Mechanism. Each
Party's contact point shall provide for the submission,
receipt, and consideration of communications from persons
of a Party on matters related to the provisions of this Chap-
ter, and shall make such communications available to the
other Parties and, as appropriate, to the public."'74
The Agreement provides for a variety of obligations and pro-
cedural guarantees relating to enforcement of national labor laws
and mechanisms to increase public awareness.'75 Institutions
designed for use as a basis for intergovernmental cooperation and
capacity building are also incorporated.'76
Certain controversies regarding enforcement of labor laws are
subject to the dispute settlement provisions of Chapter 20, which
provides a process for consultation similar to Chapter 20 of
NAFTA. If unsuccessful, the consultation may result in binding
arbitration between any two or more Parties to CAFTA-DR.
Again, only governments have access to the dispute settlement
process. As indicated above, individual violations are not subject
to dispute settlement.
Most significantly for those in Congress who had advocated
treatment of labor rights violations in the same manner as viola-
172. Id., art. 16.2(b).
173. CAFTA-DR, art. 16.8.
174. Id., art. 16.4(3).
175. CAFTA-DR, art. 16.3.
176. Id., arts.16.4, 16.5.
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tions of trade obligations, both jurisdiction and penalties are dif-
ferentiated. First, because of the "persistent pattern" language
jurisdiction over labor and environmental issues under Chapter
20 is narrower than with regard to trade related actions allegedly
inconsistent with the Agreement. Second, individual violations by
Parties under other CAFTA-DR chapters are generally subject to
Chapter 20 review.177 In practice, this may make less difference
than the textual differences suggest, given the right of any Party
to bring violations to arbitration under Chapter 20.
In lieu of trade sanctions, the most severe CAFTA-DR penalty
for uncorrected labor and environmental violations is an "annual
monetary assessment" to be determined by the arbitral panel.
The panel is to take into account such factors as the trade effects
of the non-enforcement; the pervasiveness and duration of the
non-enforcement; the reasons for non-enforcement; the level of
enforcement "that could be reasonably expected of the Party given
its resource constraints," etc. 7" Those assessments are not paid to
other Parties, but rather into a fund established by the Commis-
sion to be used for appropriate labor or environmental initiatives
in the territory of the Party complained against and consistent
with its law.'79 In other words, should Guatemala be required to
pay a monetary assessment in a panel proceeding with regard to
labor or environmental law violations, the funds would effectively
remain in Guatemala, reserved/constrained for appropriate labor
or environmental initiatives. As discussed infra, this alternative
penalty approach has been changed in the newer U.S. FTAs. The
dispute settlement provisions of the FTAs with Columbia, Peru,
Panama and Korea make no distinction between trade disputes
and labor or environmental disputes in terms of the remedy for
non-compliance with panel decisions. 180
"Labor laws" under CAFTA-DR relate to the core principles
such as the right of association; right to organize and bargain col-
lectively; prohibition on forced labor; minimum employment age
and prohibition of the ILO's worst forms of child labor; and accept-
able rules on minimum wages, maximum hours and health and
safety.' These provisions are stronger than the labor obligations
of NAFTA, at least procedurally, where it was virtually impossible
177. Id., art. 20.2.
178. Id., arts. 20.17.1 and 20.17.2.
179. Id., art. 20.17.4.
180. See Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, chs. 5 and 9 (Bipartisan Trade Deal, new
FTAs).
181. CAFTA-DR, art. 16.8.
33520111
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:2
for a Party to be subjected to dispute settlement through binding
arbitration.
Under the labor provisions of CAFTA-DR, the United States
has committed substantial sums to strengthen the ministries of
labor, modernize the labor justice system and fight discrimination,
in the amount of $20.3 million in fiscal year 2007 with similar
amounts in earlier years. 11 2 The first formal complaint under
Chapter 16 was lodged by the United States against Guatemala in
July 2010. The complaint, following a petition filed more than a
year earlier by the AFL-CIO, charges that Guatemala has failed to
enforce effectively Guatemalan laws protecting worker rights such
as freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining and
the right to work in acceptable conditions. In August 2011 the
United States government, considering that Guatemala had failed
to address systemic failures in the system, requested that an arbi-
tration panel be convened to examine Guatemala's failure to
effectively enforce its labor laws.18
3
Chapter 17 (environment) parallels Chapter 16. It draws on
the NAAEC, but with changes relating to enforcement. In Chap-
ter 17, "[a] Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environ-
mental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after
the date of entry into force of this Agreement."" 4 Thus, as with
CAFTA-DR labor provisions and the NAAEC, an isolated act of
non-enforcement is not subject to mandatory dispute settlement
under CAFTA-DR Chapter 20. The same limitations on penal-
ties-fines in place of trade sanctions-as in the labor provisions
of CAFTA-DR are applicable to environmental violations. This is,
nevertheless, a significant change compared to NAAEC (at least
182. U.S. Dept. of State, Media Note, U.S. Commits Funding for Labor and
Environmental Protection for Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement Countries, Jan. 30, 2008, at 2-3, available at http://sanjose.usembassy.gov/
CAFTADR%201abor%20fact%20sheet%20CLEAN.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2011)
[hereinafter "State, U.S. Funding"].
183. USTR, USTR Kirk Announces Labor Rights Trade Enforcement Case Against
Guatemala, Press Release, Jul. 30, 2011, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-office/press-releases2010/july/united-states-trade-representative-kirk-
announces-lab; see also Ellen Verryt, Targeting Guatemala, US Launches First-Ever
Labour Rights Dispute Under an FTA, UNIONBOOK, Aug. 26, 2010, available at http:ll
www.unionbook.org/profiles/blogs/targeting-guatemala-us (both last visited Feb. 28,
2011; Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Seeks Arbitration Panel in Labor Case Brought under
CAFTA-DR, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1322 (Aug. 11, 2001).
184. CAFTA-DR, art. 17.1; emphasis supplied. Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Seeks
Arbitration Panel in Labor Case Brought under CAFTA-DR, 28 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1322 (Aug. 11, 2001).
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on paper), since environmental disputes may be referred to bind-
ing dispute settlement in the normal manner. Enforcement is
subject to national discretion similar to that in Chapter 16.185 Pro-
cedurally, "[elach Party shall ensure that interested persons may
request the Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged
violations of its environmental laws, and that each Party's compe-
tent authorities shall give such requests due consideration in
accordance with its law."1 86
NAFTA specifically incorporated a list of MEAs, which pre-
vail over NAFTA to the extent of any NAFTA inconsistency with
them.'87 Under CAFTA-DR, there is no such list. CAFTA-DR con-
tains only a vague recognition by the Parties of the fact that "mul-
tilateral environmental agreements ... play an important role in
protecting the environment globally and domestically and that
their respective implementation of these agreements is critical to
achieving the environmental obligations of these agreements" and
a commitment to "seek means to enhance the mutual supportive-
ness" of MEAs and trade agreements.'88
In CAFTA-DR, as in NAFTA, the Parties "recognize that it is
inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental
laws."189
Unlike the Singapore, Chile, Korea and some other post-
NAFTA FTAs, in CAFTA-DR, "[any person of a Party may file a
submission asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce
its environmental laws. Such submissions shall be filed with a sec-
retariat or other appropriate body ("secretariat") that the Parties
designate." 190 These procedures do not apply to U.S. persons chal-
lenging the United States' compliance with its own environmental
laws; such complaints must be filed with the CEC pursuant to the
provisions of the NAAEC, applied mutatis mutandis.9' However,
a person other than a person of the United States may avail her-
self of the CAFTA-DR environmental Secretariat for such chal-
lenges.'92 As with the NAAEC, the Secretariat under CAFTA-DR
185. Id., art. 17.1(b).
186. Id., art. 17.3(2).
187. NAFTA, art. 104, annex 104.1.
188. CAFTA-DR, art. 17.12.1.
189. CAFTA-DR art. 17.2.2; NAFTA, art. 1114(2).
190. Id., art. 17.7(1).
191. Id., art. 17.7(3).
192. Ibid.
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is authorized to develop a factual record. 93 Under CAFTA-DR,
there is no requirement for a two-thirds vote of the Council in
order for the Secretariat to amass a factual record; it is sufficient
for a single member of the Council to make the request.'
Separate agreements among the CAFTA-DR Parties desig-
nate a new unit within the Secretariat for Central American Eco-
nomic Integration ("SIECA") as the Secretariat for receiving
citizen complaints against a Party, and set out procedures for
dealing with such submissions.'95
Whether this unit can function effectively as a mechanism for
evaluating as well as accepting citizen complaints about the Par-
ties' alleged failures to comply with the requirements of Chapter
17 will likely depend on whether it is adequately funded and
staffed; currently, the staff currently consists of only two per-
sons.'96 However, early results are somewhat encouraging. The
most prominent submission to date is a complaint by the Humane
Society International against the Dominican Republic, charging
the Dominican Republic with failure to enforce its environmental
laws with regard to protection of endangered sea turtles.97 As of
early 2011, eleven matters had been referred to the Secretariat for
Environmental Matters, four of them against Guatemala. All but
one are listed as active and all charge failure to comply with vari-
ous national environmental laws and regulations.'98 To date,
there have been no U.S. citizen complaints relating to enforce-
193. Id., art. 17.8; see NAAEC, art. 15.
194. CAFTA-DR, art. 17.8.2.
195. Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Secretariat for
Environmental Matters Under the Dominican Republic - Central America - United
States Free Trade Agreement, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
trade/cafta/caftadr-e/environmentenvironment e.asp (last visited Dec. 21, 2010);
Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters under the
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, July
27 and October 3, 2006, available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/
Regional/CAFTA/Briefing-Book/asset_upload-file803-l3194.pdf (last visited Dec. 21,
2010), art. 5.
196. See Secretariat for Environmental Matters, available at http://www.caftadr-
environment.org/left-menulsecretariat.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
197. CAFTA-DR Secretariat for Environmental Matters, Determination, in CAALA
07-001, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://cabrera-verde.org/files/Determinacion
OriginalEng.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
198. Secretariat for Environmental Matters, http://www.saa-sem.org/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2010); Joint Communiqu6 from the Fifth Meeting of the Environmental
Affairs Council of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement, Jan. 2011, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/january/joint-communiqu%C3%A9-fifth-meeting-environmental-affai
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
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ment of U.S. environmental law brought under CAFTA-DR before
the NAAEC Council on Environmental Cooperation.'99
The secretariat's first factual record, relating to the sea turtle
submission and having been requested by the United States, was
published in January 2011.200 The 80 page report compiles data
on sea turtle populations in the Dominican Republic received from
the submitters, the Government of the Dominican Republic and
several independent sources. As is the practice with factual
records, the report does not reach conclusions; it is limited to
amassing information:
The purpose of the factual record is to provide factual infor-
mation about the alleged failure to effectively enforce envi-
ronmental law by any of the countries that are parties to
the CAFTA-DR. In this regard, the documented informa-
tion can be useful to parties as well as to the general public
to serve as an objective and impartial version of the facts
connected with the case.2°'
There is reason to believe that this process, here as elsewhere,
has and will have a positive impact, at least in some instances.
The factual record in the sea turtles matter notes that
[IUn its comprehensive response, the Dominican Repub-
lic attached a copy of its Plan of Action for the Implementa-
tion of Legal, Effective Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles in the Dominican Republic 2008-2015, which
included a plan of activities and short-term priorities
regarding the completion of inventories.2"2
One can reasonably infer that the Dominican Republic was
motivated by the initiation of the proceeding in 2007 and moved
forward with conservation measures that would not have taken
place, or would not have occurred as quickly, save for the submis-
sion and decision to create a factual record.
As with the NAAEC, the scope of the environmental provi-
sions goes beyond citizen submissions. CAFTA-DR and the other
Latin American FTAs create an Environmental Affairs Council,
composed of cabinet level officials and similar to the NAAEC's
199. Email exchange with Dane Ratliff, CEC director of submissions on
enforcement matters, Feb. 22, 2011 (on file with author).
200. CAFTA-DR Environment Secretariat, Expediente de Hechos: CAALA 07-001,
Tortugas Marinas RD, at 8, available at http://www.saa-sem.org/expedientes/
expediente de hechoscaala 07.001.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
201. Id., at 71 [informal translation by author].
202. Ibid [informal translation by author].
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CEC in many respects.2"3 The Council is to oversee "the imple-
mentation of and review progress under this Chapter and to con-
sider the status of cooperation activities developed under the
Dominican Republic - Central America - United States - Environ-
mental Cooperation Agreement ("ECA"). °4 An Environmental
Cooperation Commission is charged under the ECA with develop-
ing cooperative work programs on environmental issues and fos-
tering public participation.25 The ECA and work program under
CAFTA-DR have been funded at significantly higher levels than
the CEC's $9 million; the budget for fiscal year 2007, for example,
was $19.3 million, funded entirely by the United States.2 °6 This
included $1.4 million in support for the environmental secreta-
riat. 2°7 These mechanisms allow for a variety of informal consulta-
tions at various levels, but it is unclear whether they are being
used extensively by the United States or other Parties.
D. The Bipartisan Trade Deal (BTD) and the Peru
TPA
The BTD was negotiated by U.S. Trade Representative Susan
Schwab and the Congressional and Senate leadership for the prin-
cipal purpose of obtaining the support of the Democratically con-
trolled Congress and Senate for the four then-pending FTAs,
particularly for the three with the Latin American nations of
Peru, Colombia and Panama, although the results applied to the
KORUS FTA as well.208 With control of Congress passing to the
Democrats in January 2007, it had become evident that the pend-
ing FTAs would require modifications to gain approval by
Congress.2 9
203. CAFTA-DR, supra note 2, art. 17.5.
204. Id., art. 17.5.2; Agreement among the Governments of Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States of
America on Environmental Cooperation, arts. IV, V, Feb. 8, 2005, available at http:l!
www.sice.oas.org/trade/cafta/caftadre/environmentenvcoope.asp (last visited Jan.
29, 2011).
205. CAFTA-DR, art. 17.9.
206. State, U.S. Funding, supra note 183, at 1.
207. State, U.S. Funding, supra note 183, Fact Sheet: CAFTA-DR Environmental
Projects.
208. Gary G. Yerkey, Veroneau 'Confident' Deal Can Be Struck With Congress On
Labor Provisions of FTAs, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. 373, 373 (2007).
209. Id. (discussing the efforts by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab to
reach agreement with Democrats on standards in trade agreements "Which would
pave the way for the FTAs with Columbia, Peru, and Panama to move forward in
Congress .. ").
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4. The BTD and Peru TPA-Labor
The BTD, which informally modifies the TPA requirement
even though it is not legislation, covers six areas: labor, environ-
ment, intellectual property, investment, government procurement
and port security, but the most significant elements relate to labor
and the environment, and are the only areas discussed herein.
While the differences are not revolutionary several of them are
notable. The BTD led directly to Congressional approval of the
Peru TPA once the BTD language had been used to modify the
earlier negotiated version. More than four years later, it is obvi-
ous that the BTD was not in itself sufficient to bring about Con-
gressional approval of the other three pending FTAs, which had
not been submitted to Congress as of March 2011.
As to incorporation of internationally-recognized principles
into trade agreements, the BTD requirements and limitations are
summarized by USTR as follows:
"[e]nforceable reciprocal obligation for the countries to
adopt and maintain in their laws and practice the five basic
internationally-recognized labor principles, as stated in the
[1998] ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work.
Freedom of association;
The effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining;
The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory
labor;
The effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on
the worst forms of child labor; and
The elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment and occupation.
These were subject to the usual conditions and a few new
ones.21 In particular, the obligatory incorporation by reference of
ILO standards into national law is a notable change from the
CAFTA-DR group of FTAs. CAFTA-DR lacks the enforceability of
the ILO obligations and simply defines "labor laws" with reference
to a similarly-worded list of "internationally recognized labor
210. USTR, Trade Facts, Bipartisan Trade Deal, May 2007, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/flles/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset-upl fadllel27_11319.
pdf (last visited Sep. 18, 2001) [hereinafter "BTD"], at 1. These included the
requirement that the violation affect trade and investment between the parties; a
limitation to the five basic principles plus acceptable work conditions; violations must
reflect through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction; and a limitation
to current definitions of labor laws in the FTAs and to federal labor laws alone.
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rights,"" failing to incorporate core labor principles as obligations
under the Agreement. This expansion in the Peru TPA is ground-
breaking despite other limitations in previous FTAs incorporated
in the BTD (and the Peru TPA): 1) the requirements apply only to
enforcement of federal labor laws,212 2) the dispute settlement pro-
visions may be invoked only by the Parties, and 3) panel decisions
that are neither self-executing nor able to alter U.S. or other
national law.213
In the other major departure from earlier FTAs, the BTD clar-
ifies that "[1]abor obligations [are] subject to the same dispute set-
tlement procedures and remedies as commercial obligations,
probably the most important change advocated by labor rights
advocates. Available remedies are fines and trade sanctions,
' "214based on the 'amount of trade injury'.
Presumably because the United States has not ratified many
of the ILO Conventions, 211 the BTD asserts that the United States,
even without such ratification, complies with the ILO principles of
freedom of association and collective bargaining, and the abolition
of compulsory labor, child labor and employment discrimination
through the Constitution and various laws of the United States.2 6
The BTD further specifies that FTA Parties may include in
their government contracts requirements for suppliers to comply
with core labor laws, including any applicable occupational health
and safety requirements, in the country where either the good is
produced or the services are performed. For example, a Peruvian
supplier of goods to a government agency in the United Sates may
be required to comply with core labor laws in Peru, and awards
may presumably be challenged on the basis of a failure to
211. CAFTA-DR, supra note 2, art. 16.8.
212. A possibly significant exclusion given current (February 2011) disputes in
Wisconsin and other states regarding the rights of public employees to engage in
collective bargaining. See Brady Dennis & Peter Wallsten, Obama Joins Wisconsin's
Budget Battle, Opposing Republican Anti-Union Bill, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2011
(electronic ed.), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2011/02/17/AR2011021705494_pf.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (discussing
proposed legislation that would eliminate the collective-bargaining agreements
affecting most public workers in Wisconsin, except for negotiating pay).
213. BTD, supra note 211, at 1-2; Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 17.3.
214. BTD, supra note 211, at 1.
215. The United States has failed to ratify six of the eight core ILO conventions on
freedom of association/collective bargaining; forced labor; employment discrimination;
and elimination of child labor. See ILO, Ratification of the Fundamental Human
Rights Conventions by Country, Jan. 2011, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
english/docs/declworld.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
216. BTD, supra note 211, at 2.
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comply.217
In the Peru TPA, as amended to reflect the BTD require-
ments, the relationship between international labor rights and
local law is explicitly set out:
"1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and
regulations, and practices thereunder, the following rights,
as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO
Declaration):
(a) freedom of association;
(b) the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining;
(c) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced
labor;
(d) the effective abolition of child labor and, for purposes
of this Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of
child labor; and
(e) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employ-
ment and occupation.
2. Neither Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from, or
offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its statutes or
regulations implementing paragraph 1 in a manner affect-
ing trade or investment between the Parties, where the
waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with a funda-
mental right set out in that paragraph."218
The BTD limitations are also expressed: "[t]o establish a vio-
lation of an obligation under Article 17.2.1 a Party must demon-
strate that the other Party has failed to adopt or maintain a
statute, regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or
investment between the Parties."219 Whether a Party maintains a
statute or regulation "in a manner affecting trade or investment"
is subject to some interpretation, which the panelists will presum-
ably supply if and when a labor dispute is referred to dispute set-
tlement under the binding arbitration provisions of Chapter 21 of
the Peru TPA.
In order for a Party to comply with these new provisions, it
"shall" incorporate the ILO core principles into national law; a
Party no longer satisfies the requirements by "striving" to incorpo-
rate.22° Thus, a failure to incorporate them into national law
217. Id., at 4.
218. Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 17.2.
219. Id. at art., 17.2 n.1.
220. Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 17.2(1); see BTD, supra note 210, at 2.
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becomes ipso facto a violation of the Agreement, and another
Party may seek enforcement of the obligation under the dispute
settlement provisions of the Agreement, assuming that it can
show that violations constitute a "sustained course of action or
inaction." Thus, individual violations are not actionable, just as
they are not actionable under NAALC or CAFTA-DR.
Relevant dispute settlement provisions in the Peru TPA pro-
vide that the failure of a Party to comply with a panel ruling or to
reach an agreement on compensation may lead either to the sus-
pension of trade benefits or to the imposition of a monetary fine in
lieu of trade sanctions, whether or not the subject of the dispute is
labor, the environment or something else.22'
It remains to be demonstrated whether the BTD language as
incorporated into the FTAs will significantly affect the observance
of labor rights under the FTAs, given that the language in earlier
FTAs provides a Party such as the United States the tools for
enforcement of national labor laws (as indicated in the Guatemala
action under CAFTA-DR). However, it increases the opportuni-
ties for enforcement of core labor rights as incorporated into the
Peru TPA.
5. BTD and Peru TPA-Environment
Under the BTD, the environmental provisions of future trade
agreements were also to be modified, in a manner generally paral-
lel to the labor provisions. Most significantly, a specific list of
MEAs was to be incorporated into FTAs negotiated by the United
States.222 While such a list does not appear in the earlier Bush-era
FTAs, the list approach represents an expansion of NAFTA rather
than a totally new innovation. In the BTD, the incorporated
MEAs include not only those listed in NAFTA, but also those
related to endangered species, protection of the ozone layer, con-
trol of trans-boundary movement of hazardous waste, and certain
bilateral agreements between Canada, the United States and
Mexico.223 The BTD also includes, inter alia, the Ramsar Conven-
tion on Wetlands, the International Whaling Convention, and the
221. Peru TPA, supra note 2, arts. 21.15, 21.16.
222. "The list includes (with abbreviated titles) the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances, Convention on Marine Pollution, Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Convention (IATTC), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, International Whaling
Convention (IWC), and Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR)." BTD, supra note 210, at 2.
223. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104.
344
LABOR RIGHTS
Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources.224 (The list does not include the Basel Convention on
Hazardous Waste, presumably because it has never been ratified
by the United States.)25
As in NAFTA, the BTD language provides that "[in the event
of any inconsistency between a Party's obligations under this
Agreement and a covered [environmental] agreement, the Party
shall seek to balance its obligations under both agreements, but
this shall not preclude the Party from taking a particular measure
to comply with its obligations under the covered agreement, pro-
vided that the primary purpose of the measure is not to impose a
disguised restriction on trade."22 s Also, the failure of an FTA
Party to adhere to a listed MEA is a violation of the FTA that is
subject to dispute settlement.
The environmental non-derogation obligations, like the labor
obligations, are also somewhat tightened by substituting "shall"
enforce for "strive to" enforce environmental laws, again through
fines and trade sanctions, as with trade violations. 8 Further, as
in the case of labor, government procurement contracts may
include provisions that promote environmental protection.29
The Peru TPA environmental provisions generally track the
BTD requirements; they incorporate the listed MEAs by reference
and subject a sustained or recurring cause of action or inaction to
the same government-to-government dispute settlement provi-
sions applicable to other types of disputes.2 30 Here, as in earlier
FTAs, conflicts between the Agreement and MEAs are resolved in
favor of the MEA language, assuming the conflict cannot other-
wise be resolved. But the Peru TPA uses somewhat different
language:
[i]n the event of any inconsistency between a Party's obliga-
tions under this Agreement and a covered agreement, the
Party shall seek to balance its obligations under both
224. BTD, supra note 210, at 2.
225. The United States signed the Basel Convention on the Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal March 3, 1990, but has not
completed the ratification process. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, May 5, 1992, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57
available at http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
226. See Peru TPA, supra note 2, art.18.13.4; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104(1)(d)
[similar language].
227. Id.
228. BTD, supra note 210, at 2.
229. Id. at 4.
230. Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 18.3, ch. 21.
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agreements, but this shall not preclude the Party from tak-
ing a particular measure to comply with its obligations
under the covered agreement, provided that the primary
purpose of the measure is not to impose a disguised restric-
tion on trade.23'
Other aspects have not changed from NAFTA and earlier
FTAs. For example,
[r]ecognizing the sovereign right of each Party to establish
its own levels of domestic environmental protection and
environmental development priorities, and to adopt or mod-
ify accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each
Party shall strive to ensure that those laws and policies
provide for and encourage high levels of environmental pro-
tection and shall strive to continue to improve its respective
levels of environmental protection.2"2
As with other FTAs since 2002, the parties to the Peru TPA
are required to provide opportunities for interested parties to
request investigation by governmental authorities of alleged viola-
tions of national environmental laws and judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative remedies for the same.23 As in CAFTA-DR, provi-
sion is made for designation of a secretariat to be established
under separate agreement for the purpose of receiving citizen sub-
missions. (The NAAEC Secretariat serves that function for com-
plaints against the United States brought by U.S. persons;
otherwise the mechanism under the FTA will be applicable).2 4
Where the Peru PTA diverges from some of the earlier agreements
is with respect to efforts aimed at identifying and addressing
Peru's legal, institutional and capacity building needs.235
Prior to the BTD, the United States and Peru had concluded
an Environmental Cooperation Agreement.236 Pursuant to that
agreement and to the Peru TPA, the United States and Peru
established an Environmental Cooperation Commission and have
agreed on a work program, which included the creation of a Secre-
tariat within 18 months after the entry into force of the Peru
TPA.231 Implementation of the work program and the environ-
231. Id, .art. 18.13(4).
232. Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 18.1.
233. Id. art. 18.4(1), (2).
234. Id. art. 18.8.
235. Wold, NAAEC, supra note 72, at 246.
236. Peru Environmental Cooperation Agreement, (Jul. 26, 2006), http://www.state.
gov/g/oes/env/trade/peru/81638.htm.
237. United States - Peru Environmental Cooperation, 2009-2010 Work Program,
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mental obligations of the Peru TPA were still under discussion as
of February 2010;238 it is unclear whether the Secretariat has
been formed and funded.
6. BTD and Peru TPA-Logging of Tropical Hardwoods
In the BTD, USTR "agreed to work with the Government of
Peru on comprehensive steps to address illegal logging, including
of endangered mahogany, and to restrict imports of products that
are harvested and traded in violation of CITES."239 The result,
unique among U.S. FTAs and far reaching with regard to the
extent to which one FTA partner dictates the internal operations
of another, is the incorporation of detailed obligations on the part
of Peru to control illegal logging,240 an area where compliance (or
lack of it) remains controversial. At the same time, the Annex
responds to concerns that are arguably unique to Peru among U.S.
FTA partners, and thus represents an effort to depart from the
more usual "one size fits all" U.S. approach.
Under the "Annex on Forest Sector Governance:"
The Parties recognize that trade associated with illegal log-
ging, and illegal trade in wildlife, including wildlife traf-
ficking, undermine trade in products from legally
harvested sources, reduce the economic value of natural
resources, and weaken efforts to promote conservation and
sustainable management of resources. Accordingly, each
Party commits to combat trade associated with illegal log-
ging and illegal trade in wildlife. The Parties recognize that
good forest sector governance is critical to promoting the
economic value and sustainable management of forest
resources. Accordingly, each Party commits to take action
under this Annex to enhance forest sector governance and
promote legal trade in timber products.241
The obligations under the annex include increasing forest ser-
vice personnel; civil and criminal liability "at adequate deterrent
levels" to deter violations; inventories; strategic planning; estab-
lishment of quotas for big-leaf mahogany harvesting (an endan-
10, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133528.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,
2011).
238. Statement on First U.S.-Peru Environmental Affairs Meeting: Officials
discuss compliance with provisions under bilateral Agreement, (Feb. 18, 2010), http:l!
www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/February/2010021912003lxjsnommisO.
1936762.html.
239. BTD, supra note 210, at 3.
240. Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 18.3.4, annex 18.3.4.
241. Id. annex 18.3.4, para. 1.
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gered species under CITES) 42; improved management of forest
concessions; capacity building measures by both Parties; various
audit and verification measures; and a licensing system for lum-
ber trade between the United States and Peru.243
Implementation by Peru, particularly of the Annex, has been
difficult for internal political reasons. Peru passed roughly twenty
new laws to implement the Peru TPA, but the new Forestry Law
resulted in violent protests by indigenous groups, protests that
resulted in more than thirty-five deaths. The Peruvian Congress
responded by suspending the Forestry Law. Perhaps illustrating
the law of unintended consequences, indigenous groups objected
strenuously to the new laws because of their relationship to land
tenure issues, and because of allegations that the new laws lifted
earlier prohibitions on land ownership and facilitated investment
in the jungle regions.2" The law was revised, this time in consul-
tation with indigenous, environmental and business groups.
245
The new legislation creates a new Forest and Wildlife Service to
coordinate activities throughout the sector, with duties trans-
ferred to the Environment Ministry. 26
In July 2011 the Peruvian Congress despite opposition from
indigenous groups enacted the necessary legislation, which was to
be signed into law before President Alan Garcia left office July
28.247 The USTR and some environmental groups believed this
law to be essential to assuring compliance with the Peru TPA
annex.248 Interestingly, during this period of delay and contro-
versy the environmental groups were not calling upon USTR to
242. See Lucien 0. Chauvin, U.S. Moves Regional Environmental Hub to Peru,
Plans Focus on Cross-Border Issues, 33 INT'L ENVT. REP. (BNA) 72 (Jan. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter Chauvin I] (discussing the controversy over tropical hardwoods).
243. Peru TPA, supra note 2, annex 18.3.4, paras. 2-12.
244. Lucien 0. Chauvin, Indigenous Groups in Peru Clash with Police as Protests
over Forest Laws Turn Violent, 32 INT'L ENvT. REP. (BNA) 507 (Jun. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Chauvin II].
245. Chauvin I, supra note 242; Lucien 0. Chauvin, Peruvian Congress Suspends
Forestry Law That Sparked Protests by Indigenous Groups, 32 INT'L ENV'T. REP.
(BNA) 560 (Jun. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Chauvin III].
246. Lucien 0. Chauvin, Peru's Government Unveils Forestry Plan to Combat
Climate Change via Conservation, 33 INT'L ENVT. REP. (BNA) 758 (Aug. 4, 2010)
[hereinafter Chauvin IV].
247. Lucien 0. Chauvin, Peru's Congress Passes Forestry Legislation Needed to
Comply with U.S. Trade Accord, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1147 (Jul. 7, 2011). See
Peru: New Forest Law Faces Resistance from Indigenous Communities, FORDAQ,
THE TIMBER NETWORK, (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.fordaq.com/fordaq/news/logs-
softwood-plywood_24997.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
248. U.S. 'Monitoring Situation' After Peru Fails to Act on New Forestry Law,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 24, 2010, at 5..
348
LABOR RIGHTS
initiate formal dispute settlement; they urge extended consulta-
tions and ask that USTR "signal[s] clearly to the Peruvians the
importance of finishing the process around this forest law."249 This
approach in retrospect appears to have been a wise one, although
it remains uncertain whether the enactment of the legislation
will result in a prompt end to the controversy. The new president,
Ollanta Humala, has promised to honor Peru's obligations under
the PTA with the United States, presumably including the for-
estry provisions, but has also indicated the he intends to focus on
Latin American integration.250
IV. IMPROVING THE FTA PROVISIONS:
PRESENT AND FUTURE
A. Existing and Pending FTAs
Despite the efforts by some labor and environmental rights
groups to incorporate stronger and broader, supposedly enforcea-
ble, legal protections in U.S. FTAs, one can reasonably question
whether the changes in the formal dispute settlement provisions
are likely to be successful in improving observance of core labor
rights and good environmental practices. The government-to-gov-
ernment dispute settlement mechanisms in FTAs are seldom
used; cases are rare regardless of the subject matter of the dis-
pute. Even in NAFTA, where more than a dozen requests for con-
sultation have been lodged,251 there have been only three
arbitrations in the seventeen years during which NAFTA has
been in force, with the last arbitral decision rendered ten years
ago.252 There have been no arbitrations of trade disputes involving
the United States under any of the other U.S. FTAs,252 although a
noted earlier the United States is seeking arbitration of labor non-
compliance issues with regard to Guatemala. However, even with
a lack of formal proceedings one can reasonably argue that the
249. Id. (quoting Andrea Johnson, director of forest campaigns at the
Environmental Investigation Agency).
250. Lucien 0. Chauvin, New Peru President to Stress Latin America Integration,
but Promises to Honor U.S. FTA, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1088 (Jun. 30, 2011).
251. Gantz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 143.
252. See Status Report of Dispute Settlement, U.S. Section, NAFTA SECRETARIAT,
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/StatusReportResults.aspx (last visited Dec. 22,
2010) (showing only three arbitrations). The decision in the Cross-Border Trucking
case was issued on Feb. 6, 2001.
253. A request for consultations under CAFTA-DR between the Central American
nations and the Dominican Republic was rumored to be pending as of January 2011,
but could not be confirmed.
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existence of such provisions may encourage parties to the agree-
ments to negotiate reasonable solutions.
Experience with CAFTA-DR in particular suggests that a
comprehensive effort by the United States Government, with the
good faith cooperation of the Parties to the FTA, to implement
and, if necessary, expand the mechanisms in U.S. FTAs designed
to require) an analysis of citizen petitions by an independent coun-
cil and secretariat or fact-finding body, would be productive.
Expanding the consultation and cooperation efforts facilitated by
the existence of such mechanisms is also desirable. The same
Environmental Affairs Council and Labor Affairs Council, or their
equivalents under other agreements, along with a secretariat for
the Environmental Affairs Council, should also be provided with
the authority, funds and expertise to support cooperative activi-
ties aimed at improving compliance with the substantive labor
and environmental provisions.
All of the U.S. FTAs already contain provisions that can rea-
sonably serve as the basis for improved labor and environmental
cooperation, technical assistance and training, acceptance and
review of citizen complaints and enforcement, as the labor action
brought by the United States against Guatemala confirms. If not
in the original text, these provisions are expressed in the supple-
mental agreements such as the two NAFTA side agreements and
the subsidiary agreements concluded with respect to CAFTA-DR.
Thus, for example, the existence of the labor obligations in all of
the FTAs provides a solid legal basis and procedural mechanism
for U.S. government complaints.
The language in the latest group of FTAs with Peru, Colom-
bia, Panama and South Korea actually increases U.S. influence,
should it choose to use it, because it requires incorporation of core
international labor standards into domestic legislation."4 A fail-
ure of a Party to adopt and maintain its statutes, regulations, and
practices consistent with the rights "stated in the ILO Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up
(1998)" makes it a violation of the FTAs. 2 5 At present, the United
States' credibility in enforcing high labor standards with FTA
partners is for some observers limited by U.S. domestic practices,
such as limits to the right to organize under some state laws.256
254. See, e.g., KORUS, supra note 2, art. 19.2.1.
255. See, e.g., Peru TPA, supra note 2, art. 17.2.1.
256. Almost half of the U.S. states have so-called "right to work" laws, which
generally prohibit unions from requiring employees to join and pay union dues.
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With regard to the environmental provisions, U.S. practices mir-
ror the obstructionism that has characterized the NAFTA Parties'
responses to efforts by the NAAEC Secretariat to establish factual
record in some instances.
Thus, among other things, Barak Obama's campaign promise
that if elected he would renegotiate NAFTA to incorporate the
labor and environment provisions in the body of the agreement,
making them, inter alia, subject to the Chapter 20 dispute settle-
ment mechanism, was ill-advised and unlikely to result in
improved observance of labor and environmental rights under
NAFTA. The subsequent abandonment of NAFTA re-negotiation
in the face of demands from Canada and Mexico to reopen other
NAFTA provisions was perhaps as inevitable as it was welcomed
by those who were skeptical from the outset.257
Further, the effectiveness of labor and environment provi-
sions in the newest FTAs, like the weaker ones in earlier U.S.
FTAs and the "side" agreements in NAFTA, depends mostly on
the willingness of the U.S. president and Congress to commit suf-
ficient funds, staff and technical assistance (minor compared to
other expenditures on foreign aid), and the political will to imple-
ment citizen submission procedures, even when the United States
is the respondent. In this respect, the NAALC Commission and
NAAEC CEC and Secretariat deserve another look, since it has
been poor implementation, rather than the structure, that is pri-
marily responsible for their shortcomings. A quasi-independent
NAAEC-style secretariat, with both a mandate and sufficient
resources to investigate citizen complaints and supported by a
political commitment by all Parties to cooperate through the
Council or Commission in providing timely information responsive
to citizen submissions, is still a reasonable model. While the pro-
cess in CAFTA-DR is still evolving, the fact that there are pres-
ently eleven proceedings pending before the Environmental
Council and one factual record was recently completed suggests
that NGOs approach this mechanism as an important tool and
Advocates believe that such laws foster freedom of employment. Labor groups argue
that allowing workers who benefit from unions to avoid contributing to union coffers
undermine unions' ability to organize workers. See John Steven Niznik, Right to
Work: Right to Work States and Laws, ABOUT.COM, http://jobsearchtech.about.com/od/
laborlaws/a/right towork_2.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
257. See GMNwz, RTAs, supra note 3, at 88; Rossella Brevetti, Kirk Says USTR to
Review Colombia FTA, Reopening of NAFTA May not be Necessary, 26 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 534, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 2009 WL 1085995 asserting that the
Administration's problems with NAFTA "can be addressed without having to reopen
the agreement".)
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that the CAFTA-DR governments are capable of taking their envi-
ronmental obligations seriously.
Additionally, expanded financial and capacity building assis-
tance is essential in meeting other obligations of the environmen-
tal provisions, such as analyzing the environmental effects of
trade under specific agreements. This is evident with the Jordan
FTA, as well as with CAFTA-DR and the Peru TPA (including con-
siderable effort by the United States to work with Peru on logging
issues). Fulfilling these needs could be enhanced through techni-
cal assistance and better cooperation among the parties to the
respective FTA, along with political pressure where advisable.
The same is of course true with regard to improvements in
enforcement of national labor laws through strengthening of labor
ministries and judicial systems.
As of September 2011, there seems to be a reasonable possi-
bility that the United States-Korea FTA ("KORUS FTA") will be
approved by the Congress during 2011, largely because there is
strong pressure from the business community to do so and
because of the support from the United Auto Workers union,
despite opposition by most other unions such as the AFL-CIO and
the Teamsters.258 As of the beginning of 2011, the Obama Admin-
istration remained much less enthusiastic in committing itself to
moving forward on the FTAs with Colombia and Panama."9 How-
ever, the Colombia and Panama FTAs, now with the strong sup-
port of President Obama, now seem likely to be approved after
resolution of a stalemate over Trade Adjustment Assistance,
although such a result is by no means certain.26 ° Insofar as I
have been able to determine, there has been no credible sugges-
tion of amending any of the three agreements with regard to the
labor or environmental provisions, although some members of
Congress have lodged various objections to the Colombian Govern-
ment's treatment of labor leaders. 1
258. Rossella Brevetti, Teamsters President Announces Opposition to Revised Korea
ETA, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 321, Feb. 24, 2011, available at 2011 WL 639337.
259. Editorial, See The U.S. has no Good Reason to Stall on Latin American Free-
Trade Deals, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 20, 2010 (chiding the Administration for
"drag[ging] its heels on Columbia and Panama free trade").
260. See Brady Confident on Pending Trade Deals, Cites "Tight Agreement" on
Approval Process, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1476 (Sep. 15, 2011) (Reporting House
Ways and Means Committee Chair Kevin Brady's confidence that the House, Senate
and White House have reached agreement on a process for moving forward with the
three FTAs).
261. Gary G. Yerkey, Democratic Leaders Reject Bush Call for Early Vote on
Colombia Free Trade Pact, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 30, 2008, at D1, available at 2008
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B. New FTAs - The TPP and Beyond
When and if the United States concludes additional FTAs,
such as the TPP,262 political necessity will almost certainly require
U.S. officials to include labor and environmental chapters. The
language proposed by the United States will likely emulate the
2007 BTD and the Peru TPA. Thus, the U.S. negotiating posi-
tion-not yet fully determined2 3-is likely to focus on detailed
substantive obligations (core labor rights and MEAs) as well as on
enforceability using the general dispute settlement mechanism in
the Agreement. These attributes appear to be the basis for the
U.S. negotiating positions in the TPP negotiations, at least with
regard to the environmental provisions."4
The complexities of negotiating labor and environmental pro-
visions in the TPP context should not be underestimated. The
current negotiations consist of nine potential Parties: the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Chile, Brunei,
Vietnam and Malaysia, with the possible addition of one or more
others. 65 The United States already has free trade agreements
with four of them, Australia, Chile, Peru and Singapore, each with
similar labor and environmental provisions. Moreover, four of the
Parties participating in the TPP negotiations, Australia, New Zea-
land, the United States and Singapore, are developed countries
WL 224583. As of February 2011, it is not clear what steps the Colombian
Government could take, if any, to satisfy critics in Congress.
262. This is the only new trade agreement anyone in the Administration has
embraced. Peru Says Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks Top Priority, With More
Countries Joining In, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 18, 2010, at D9, available at 2010 WL
4038190( (discussing the status of the negotiations and the likely parties); Rossella
Brevetti, USTR Sees Steady Progress in TPP Round, Market Access Offers Next
Month, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Dec. 14, 2010, D5, available at 2010 WL 5067283
(reporting on market access discussions).
263. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE (ONLINE EDITION), Jan. 13, 2011, at 1, available at
insidetrade.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that U.S. positions on these issues
remained at the time to be tabled).
264. The draft of the environmental chapter tabled by the United States in
September 201lis said to closely resemble the BTD and Peru TPA language; it
includes inter alia seven multilateral environmental agreements for which the FTA
signatories would be required to fulfill their obligations, but that list itself is subject
to negotiation. U.S. Tables Full Environmental Chapter, Reflects "May 10" Deal,
WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Sep. 16, 2011. However, labor proposals have not been tabled
as of September 2011. U.S. Holds Off on Tabling SOE, Labor Proposals at Latest TPP
Round, WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Sep. 16, 2011.
265. Japan has expressed interest but apparently put off any decision to join the
negotiations until June, which may be too late, according to sources Chauvin, Peru,
supra note 264 at 230 (discussing the current status of the talks and the likely
participants).
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with generally strong labor and environmental protections as well
as functioning legal arrangements for enforcement. In the other
nations, both the laws and enforcement mechanisms are weaker.
The extent to which an effort to harmonize those provisions
will be undertaken, and the content of the harmonized provisions,
remains to be determined, not only with labor and environment
but also regard to intellectual property, investment and many
other FTA provisions. At minimum, it seems likely that Austra-
lia, New Zealand and perhaps Singapore will have their own ideas
as to how best to deal with labor and environmental issues in the
TPP. Thus, the United States may have to prioritize its objectives
with regard to labor and environment, without being able to dic-
tate the full package to the other negotiators. The inclusion of
such provisions in the form preferred by the United States may
require concessions in other sectors. Should the U.S. wish to reo-
pen the labor and environmental provisions of the earlier U.S.
FTAs, it must expect that some of those nations will want to reo-
pen unrelated provisions (such as Australian access to the U.S.
sugar market), much as Mexico and Canada would have done had
the Obama Administration insisted on reopening NAFTA.
These complexities among others make it virtually certain
that the TPP negotiations will be not concluded even in principle
by the Administration's stated target date, the end of 2011,266 and
probably not during the U.S. presidential election year of 2012.
One can hope that the TPP will not meet the fate of the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas, where negotiations died with a
whimper some nine years after their initiation. 7
V. CONCLUSIONS
Regardless of the extent to which one considers the labor
rights and environmental provisions embodied in U.S. trade
266. The United States originally hoped to complete the negotiations by November
2011, when it will host the rotating annual meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Forum. See Kirk, Sanchez Raise Doubts about Reaching Final
TPP Deal in November, WORLD TRADE ONLINE, Feb. 14, 2011 (quoting U.S. Trade Rep.
Ron Kirk as stating "If we could meet that goal [Nov. 20111 that would be
exceptional"). However, that deadline has been abandoned; see Michael Bologna, TPP
Negotiators See Progress on Legal Texts; Groups Push Positions During Chicago
Round, 28 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1496 (Sep. 15, 2011) (reporting on the inclusive
nature of the negotiations after the September 2011 meeting, where textile rules of
origin among other aspects of the negotiations could not be concluded).
267. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA Negotiations: A Melodrama in Five Acts, 1
LOYOLA INT'L L. REV. 121 (2004) (discussing the FTAA negotiations and the reasons
for their failure).
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agreements to reflect established human rights or human rights
in progress, there is little doubt that improving conditions for
workers and the local environment are worth-while objectives
which support basic international human rights and environmen-
tal protection conventions. International trade, after all, has
never been entirely about the movement of goods and services;
culture, morality, security and, indeed, human rights, have
always been part of the equation, whether articulated or not. The
U.S. FTAs, the rights and obligations they provide and the mecha-
nisms for implementing them go well beyond what is commonly
found in the ILO accords and MEAs. These FTA mechanisms, for-
mal and informal, have provided various means (even if not effec-
tively used) for improving labor/environmental situations in
member nations, through encouragement, financial and technical
assistance and diplomatic pressure, depending on the
circumstances.
Governments will, after all, continue to do what they perceive
to be in their national interests. If, for example, Jordan, Guate-
mala and Peru conclude that it is in the country's national inter-
est to respond favorably to U.S. urging to improve labor rights
enforcement (Jordan and Guatemala), or to regulate logging in
sensitive areas (Peru), they will act accordingly. Those govern-
ments would probably have been less willing to act in the absence
of labor and environment provisions in their respective FTAs.
In a more perfect world one could contemplate a broad ILO
accord and a series of MEAs that would provide minimum labor
and environmental standards, respectively, opportunities for citi-
zen complaints, cooperation for capacity building and binding
enforcement mechanisms for violations, with the prospect of sanc-
tions for non-compliance. However, such agreements are likely
many years or decades from fruition, even should strong support
of the United States for either be forthcoming, an unlikely devel-
opment in the foreseeable future.
In this perhaps unfortunate real world situation, existing and
new U.S. FTAs could be improved vehicles for cooperation
between the developed and developing Parties in improving labor
and environmental protection practices to the benefit of both
groups, even though funding and political constraints in the
United States may limit what is possible at the present time. The
medium and longer term goals seem most likely to be achieved if
each agreement makes provision, either in the text or in supple-
mental agreements, for quasi-independent secretariats that have
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adequate financial resources, provision of technical expertise, and
freedom from undue interference by the Parties. Proper function-
ing also requires Parties' cooperation in the national labor office or
environmental secretariat's investigations of citizen complaints
and construction of factual records, as well as with the traditional
legal and institutional mechanisms of cooperation and capacity
building. In the final analysis, imperfect as U.S. FTA provisions
may be, they are significantly better in support of labor rights and
environmental protection internationally and regionally than the
alternatives most other governments prefer-doing nothing.
Comment
C. Ryan Reetz*
I think one of the most interesting things about Professor
Gantz' presentation, in addition to the breadth and depth with
which he has amassed all the information on the various treaties
and the means of addressing rights under them - what was espe-
cially significant to me as a litigation and arbitration person con-
cerned with going to court or arbitration and getting a remedy, is
the variety of possible means of effectuating these labor and envi-
ronmental rights, even in the context of a trade agreement. For
example, something we haven't yet seen but could eventually see
is a very strong enforcement mechanism, similar to under NAFTA
chapter 11, where an individual aggrieved party might be able to
bring a proceeding. Of course, we do have state-to-state arbitra-
tion mechanisms under the existing treaties, although they are
not as strong as they might be in other contexts. But there are also
other available means of vindicating these rights, such as techni-
cal cooperation or the factual record development that was
discussed.
Curiously, sometimes a strong enforcement mechanism may
not be the most effective at promoting rights under these agree-
ments. I think that is because ultimately governments are only
willing to agree to and to do what is in their best interests at the
time. They are not necessarily going to feel pressured to comply
with an award or to give in to other forms of dispute resolution
pressures when they know that they can subsequently renegotiate
an agreement or try to work around sanctions. So that even a
final resolution under a strong enforcement mechanism is not nec-
essarily final in this context. And the idea that governments tend
to only do what is in their best interest as they conceive it at the
time, I see that in national court litigation all the time. Our courts
in the U.S. only extend comity to foreign laws or judgments, only
comply with treaties, when there is some sense that it is in the
* C. Ryan Reetz is a partner in DLA Piper's international arbitration and
litigation practice, representing clients as trial counsel in international and domestic
commercial and regulatory disputes. His litigation and arbitration practice ranges
from investment disputes and sovereign immunity challenges to class actions, unfair
trade practice cases, fraud and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act claims and contract disputes. He has also served as an arbitrator in
international commercial disputes.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:2
broad national interest to do so. We don't have, for example, the
monist theory of international law where a treaty becomes part of
our law simply because the U.S. is a party to it. The rash of invest-
ment treaty arbitrations I think also supports this point. Why are
there so many investment treaty arbitrations? There are probably
many answers to that. One possibility is that many parties (both
governments and private parties) are making the decisions that
they feel the need to make without necessarily first engaging in a
formal legalistic analysis of their perceived rights and obligations
under international legal norms. So these strong enforcement
mechanisms may not work.
Even in agreements that do provide for a direct means of
enforcing labor and environmental provisions, we see that very
few disputes are actually taken to conclusion. That may be
because of the persuasive power that is inherent in these provi-
sions. But it is also true that challenging a foreign government in
formal proceedings is a very expensive process. Whether you are
doing that either as an individual or group, or through your gov-
ernment as a proxy, it takes a lot of time, energy, and commit-
ment. This happens in investment arbitrations because the stakes
are typically so large that it makes economic sense to do so. But
when we are talking about defending individual rights or rights of
groups of people who are not politically empowered, it is more dif-
ficult to sustain the economic burden of enforcing these rights, so
that the formal enforcement mechanisms may not be the best
approach.
Professor Gantz also referred to the fact that the scope of
labor and environmental rights seems to expand and contract
with time according to the circumstances. That is clearly what we
are seeing here in the U.S. where the dominance of labor unions
has declined quite a bit over the decades, and as recently as this
week we have seen legislative proposals that arguably infringe on
fundamental collective bargaining rights. This is not to suggest
that there are not core values in these areas or core rights in these
areas, but their parameters are really not clear at all. And the
lack of a stable consensus over what they mean, means that for-
mal dispute resolution mechanisms may not be the best way of
achieving those ends.
We also need to take into account the purpose of labor and
environmental provisions in trade promotion agreements. It is
only in recent decades that we have what might be called a protec-
tionist alliance of classical protectionist interests, who don't want
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to face competition from foreign producers who aren't bound by
high labor and environmental standards, and other groups who
are interested in promoting labor and environmental values inter-
nationally for their own sake. The focus of these agreements is on
trade, and many of the standards in the agreements say that a
country's failure to enforce its laws only violates the agreement if
that failure takes place in a manner that affects trade. So, the
purpose and scope of the labor and environmental provisions sug-
gests that they are not primarily designed to secure these rights,
but rather to maintain an appropriate environment for promoting
trade.
Finally, I think that it is probably fair to conclude that the
real benefits of these agreements, in terms of labor and environ-
mental rights, are likely to come from economic incentives. They
are likely to be driven by economic factors. If governments feel
that providing a higher level of protection is in their own economic
best interest or there is some other economic incentive for this to
happen - whether it is a greater flow of trade, or the threat of a
factual record being developed that may cause problems, or these
mechanisms of fines that are paid into a fund that is used to pro-
mote technical development goals - when those kinds of incen-
tives exist, I think we are more likely to see actual action driven
by those incentives. Thanks.
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Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez*
Thank you very much for the invitation. I'm very happy to be
here. Let me take you inside the negotiation of the SAID agree-
ments to the NAFTA between Mexico the U.S. and to a lesser
extent, Canada. When we did an inventory of the environmental
laws and especially the labor laws of the three countries, a very
interesting finding emerged. Of the three countries, the country
with the highest standards in the books was Mexico. The Mexican
revolution in 1917, the fact that we inherited our private law per-
fectly codified from Europe but then had to go on ourselves and
write our public laws after adopting the U.S. model of govern-
ment, yielded a situation where Mexico has very strict laws of
moderate application. As opposed to the U.S. system where the
laws are moderate but they are very strictly applied.
This paradox has a very profound impact on the ability of the
rule of law to develop in Mexico. So when you enter into a negotia-
tion where the premise is you assume a conventional international
obligation to apply your own law, you can see very clearly what
asymmetry is. Very briefly, I think it is undisputed that there is a
correlation between economic development and the ability of a
state to protect certain rights. So, protection would look a little bit
like this... As GDP grows, the level of protection increases. How-
ever, when you enter into a negotiation with a more developed
country, let's say the U.S. right here, and Mexico is somewhere
down here. The premise is you now have to enforce your own laws
or face trade sanctions, fines, or whatever it is. Well, you have a
gap, right? You now have to comply with this level of protection
much earlier in history than the developed country had to in the
past. If you on top of that add the poetry that we write into our
laws, if there is to be a response to Martinez' earlier question...
what is intrinsically common to Latin American countries, this
might be the answer: That we have laws that are very strict, but
* Mr. Aguilar-Alvarez served as Principal Legal Counsel for the government of
Mexico for the negotiation and implementation of the North American Free Trade
(NAFTA) and free trade agreements with Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia and
Venezuela. Previously, Mr. Aguilar-Alvarez was Counsel and General Counsel of the
ICC International Court of Arbitration. Mr. Aguilar-Alvarez is a Visiting Lecturer in
Law at the Yale Law School (2005-2010).
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moderately implied. So in our books, this might be the level of
protection.
So, I get asked the question: are trade agreements the right
kind of instrument to fix this problem? My answer is maybe but
not if you don't take care of the substantive problem here and the
timing issue here. I will stop my comment there, I just want to
throw this wrench into the discussion and hopefully provoke some
kind of discussion with the audience. On the issue of Chapter 20,
case 6, I would say today that the dispute settlement chapter of
NAFTA comprises three stages. The panel is normally the third
stage, and cases only get there if they were not settled in the pre-
vious two stages. Before the first stage, NAFTA created about 30
working groups, technical working groups, in every topic that
NAFTA deals with. Many of the disputes get resolved either at the
working group level or at the political level in one of the first two
stages. This is what I wanted to add. This was the elephant in the
room...
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Jan Paulsson*
I thought as the last substantive speaker before you today,
that I would take a couple of steps back and say two things about
the general importance of the things that we have been discussing
today and at the very end I think I will be coming back to profes-
sor Gantz' paper.
First something quite lighthearted since it is the end of the
day, and after that I will hit you with something really serious.
NAFTA is a very historic thing. It is part of my history. I remem-
ber it first 20 years ago when my good friend Guillermo was
snatched away from a very pleasant life in Paris by the president
of Mexico who absolutely insisted that he go back and negotiate a
NAFTA, which he then did. And so for a couple of years you could
call him at any time of day, so I had the feeling that something
very important was under foot. Fast forward 10 years I found
myself sitting on the first arbitral tribunal deciding an investor
state dispute under NAFTA on the merits.
This was the very first case known as the Zenyan. This felt
rather exalted. I was sitting there with the former attorney gen-
eral of the US to my left and the former president of the bar asso-
ciation of Mexico to my right, hearing this particular claim which
actually become interestingly enough something that is cited from
time to time, or rather often, for the proposition that an interna-
tional tribunal will respect the res judicata of the national court,
provided that the national court decision itself did not violate
international law in some procedural way i.e. denial of justice. The
case itself, however, had to do with garbage.
These were sanitation engineers but they all looked like they
had come into the profession before it was felt necessary to use
euphemisms to describe what they did. You might forgive an arbi-
trator for being somewhat concerned, one shouldn't be concerned
about these things, if the decision would disappoint the claimants,
the fact that any one of them could wring your neck in about ten
* Professor Jan Paulsson holds the Michael Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair
at the University of Miami School of Law. He is also the Faculty Chair of the
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seconds, should not come into play at all. Fast forward a little bit
later, just a couple of years ago a movie came out called Borat.
Now I will tell you something about NAFTA that you have
never heard before, I think. Borat involves a Kazak journalist
coming to discover the United States. He is played by Sasha
Baren-Cohen, a north Londoner who is absolutely unafraid of
embarrassing himself. As anyone who saw the movie, one cringes
from beginning to end. And he travels around the United States
with his sidekick, who is his driver from Kazakhstan. And one of
the most cringe inducing moments in that motion picture is when
the two of them, for reasons which totally escape anybody, find
themselves naked on a bed in a very small motel room and they
begin to wrestle. And the camera gets very close up and one
wishes one was not watching this movie. At one point I was
observing the face of Borat's driver and I thought to myself, I
know this man.
That was Mr. Devician, the sanitation engineer who had gone
into a second career... The more serious thing, taking a few steps
back. The reason one is interested in international law is that all
kinds of things come into one's attention sphere. What is the inter-
est, policy wise, of our international community in the agreements
that underlie trade law and investment law? Why is it that we
want to give legal effect to these negotiations? They are all negoti-
ations. There are trade agreements. There are agreements that
give legal protection to investors. They are negotiated and they
become implicated in the notion of the rule of law, which immedi-
ately raises a question of sovereignty, because when you commit
to an undertaking you give up a piece of sovereignty. And now the
international community is going to impose the consequences of
having given up that little bit of sovereignty and we very quickly
get into some very thorny questions.
Such as, if an investor has signed a very significant agree-
ment and begun to invest very large amounts of money, let's say
two or three years ago, on the faith of a contract signed with Colo-
nel Kadafi, how is that investor feeling today? And what is the
nature of the binding commitment vis a vis the state of Libya rep-
resented as it will be one year from now by Colonel Kadafi or per-
haps not? Some simple questions occur to us. First of all, are we
in favor of the promotion of international trade and international
investment? We have to answer that question. Most of us will say
yes. It's not obvious that we have to say yes. It was very fashiona-
ble in France in the 1970's to discuss something, which was called
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La Politique de la Ruptque? This was not something, which was
propounded by responsible government officials, the politics of
rupture. But it was very fashionable intellectually to say that each
country should in its pride follow a policy of autarchy, do what it
wanted to do at any moment and not rely on anybody else, includ-
ing relying on the international standards of the rule of law.
So that we need to decide. The second thing we might think
about in this context is if we are in favor of those who engage in
trade and those who engage in investment, businesses and inves-
tors? Are we in favor of corporations or are we in favor of states?
Actually I think we should decide that too in about one second, we
should be in favor of states that represent the people. We are
interested in the welfare of the members of our community. It is
very silly to think we support an abstraction like a corporation; if
they weren't useful as a way of mobilizing capital we would give
up on them. So that is not the question then. The question really
is why is it in the interest of states that represent the collectivity
to respect the rule of law and to accept ultimately that these bits
of sovereignty that are given out are going to be sanctioned by the
external agent to the state of some form of international
adjudication.
Now here I propose that the answer to that question is that
we should only do that as the international community because
the result of doing it is going to improve the terms of trade and the
terms of investment for the state involved. Now no state is more
successful at dealing with the rule of law in this sense than Swit-
zerland because people will invest in Switzerland for the mere
promise of getting their money back. In the wicked world in which
we live some people are really happy to know that they will get
zero percent return but they will get their capital back. Switzer-
land is so risk free in the minds of many that one will invest on
that basis. What rate of return would you require to invest in
Libya today? What rate of return would you require to invest in
Belarus for example? I think you might want 20 percent every six
months. And after six months you probably want to clear out in
case your relations aren't so good. That's not good for the people of
Belarus because that's the wrong type of investment they are get-
ting under those circumstances. It's not long term, it's very expen-
sive, and it has the moral hazard of involving quite a lot of
potential corruption. So when we come around this circle, I think
it seems that the interest of everything we are talking about today
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ultimately has to come down to saying that instrumentally the
rule of law has nothing to do with being nice or moral.
Instrumentally, it is a way of improving the terms of trade
and improving the terms of investment long term for the state
that receives them. And if that's not true, there is no interest in it
whatsoever. Now back to the immediate section that we are dis-
cussion, the difficulty of the soft law component of this discussion
is how do you analyze the advantages of the soft law when it is,
Guillermo used the word "moderately enforced or moderately
enforceable." That is the conundrum as I see it.
